



# Advantaged group's reactions to protests

Support of the advantaged group to religiously or racially framed minority  
group's (non)normative protests

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### Abstract

This research investigated the reactions of advantaged group members (Europeans) to (non)normative protests held by racially (racism) or religiously (Islamophobia) framed minority groups (Turkish immigrants). We expected that Islamophobia protests would be supported less, because we suspected that religion would be seen as more of a choice than race, and therefore Muslims would be more blameworthy for their low status. Moreover, we expected nonnormative Islamophobia protests to be the least supported, as those can be linked to radicalism. We conducted a 2 (type of action) x 2 (framing of the minority group) between subjects study, with 246 first year psychology students at the RUG. Participants filled in an online questionnaire, and were presented with a (constructed) newspaper article, after which we measured their support for protest and other variables. Nonnormative Islamophobia protests were supported significantly less than normative Islamophobia protests and racially framed protests. Normative conditions did not differ significantly. It seems that some minority groups that use nonnormative forms of action are at a disadvantage to achieving equality, as they gain less support by advantaged group members.

**Keywords:** Collective action, majority group, advantaged group, minority group, disadvantaged group, support, social identity theory, discrimination, religion, racism, Islamophobia, image threat, choice, stereotypes, system justification, social dominance orientation

### Advantaged group's reactions to protests

*“There comes a time when one must take a position that is neither safe, nor politic, nor popular, but he must take it because conscience tells him it is right.”* Martin Luther King, Jr.

Throughout history, different prejudiced minority groups have held protests in order to achieve equal rights for their group, such as the women's march, or the Black Lives Matter movement. There are many different forms of discrimination and many groups can be subjected to prejudice and discrimination. For example, people are discriminated because of their race or gender, but also because of their religion. In this research, we are particularly interested in how protest against discrimination framed in terms on race versus religion may be viewed because, as explained later, there may be important differences in the degree of sympathy and support these elicit. We are specifically interested in the conditions under which advantaged group members support or even join the protests of disadvantaged groups. In other words, when do individuals whose group has a high status support the protests held by low-status group members?

Protests can take many different forms, as can be seen in the Black Lives Matter movement. Whereas some forms of protests are peaceful, such as petitions, for others, such as some demonstrations, violence is not uncommon. The form protests may take is also likely to be an important factor that could determine the support of the advantaged group. In the present research we put these factors together: specifically, we are interested in the advantaged group's support for protests that are held to reduce racial versus religious prejudice, and how this support may be affected by the form of protest (moderate or normative vs. more radical or anti-normative). Gaining further insights into the conditions under which advantaged group members join or support protests held by disadvantaged groups, is important because the advantaged group can be a major ally to the cause of disadvantaged group members.

### **Challenging inequality**

As explained by Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Hornsey, 2008), people are inclined to favor their own group, and be less favorable to outgroups. This can lead to the institutional discrimination against groups that are less often represented in society. Moreover, negative stereotypes towards outgroups can contribute to this, as negative stereotypes allow the rationalization of the individual's prejudice against an outgroup

(Allport, 1954; LaViolette & Silvert, 1951; Saenger, 1953; Simpson & Yinger, 1965; Tajfel, 1981).

According to Dixon and colleagues (2012), there are at least two approaches that can be considered when one wants to achieve equality. The first approach would be to diminish prejudice by creating a common identity or bringing people in contact with one another. According to the authors, however, the positive effects of this approach have mostly been shown in majority groups. The effects for the disadvantaged (minority) group, seems not to be as positive. Moreover, when talking about inclusion or inequality reduction, majority groups positively affected by the “reduced prejudice” approach, tend to favor forms of inclusion that leave intact the status hierarchy (a “one-group” representation of common identity), whereas the minority group favors a dual-identity model in which their identity is accepted and integrated in society. Majority groups also tend to lack support for the changes that are actually needed in order to diminish inequality. Therefore, Dixon et al. consider a second approach for inequality reduction: collective action. Collective action is often defined as “any action that individuals undertake as psychological group members, and with the subjective goal to improve their group’s conditions” (Wright et al., 1990 in Van Zomeren, 2013). Dixon and colleagues (2012) argue that collective action might actually be the approach that causes the changes needed within society in order to reduce inequality.

Collective action can take the form of normative action, or nonnormative action. Whereas normative action encompasses forms of protest that are legal and generally accepted (part of the norm from a societal perspective), nonnormative action is often illegal and perceived as rather extreme (not part of the norm from a societal perspective; Wright et al., 1990). A substantial amount of research has been done on (non)normative collective actions of minority groups. Many researchers have concluded normative action takes place in unstable disadvantaged group positions (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), whereas nonnormative actions are more effective and arise under stable disadvantaged group positions (Wright, 2009). Moreover, normative action often occurs when feelings of efficacy and anger are high, but nonnormative action is more likely when feelings of efficacy are low and contempt is high (Tausch et al., 2011).

Much less studied are the reactions of majority group members to this collective action undertaken by minority group members. What is interesting, is that advantaged (majority) group members, can support collective action in favor of the disadvantaged group (Wright, 2009). However, if advantaged group members support collective actions of people they consider an outgroup, this contrasts with the definition of collective action mentioned before,

in which individuals undertake action as group members. According to Bliuc et al. (2007), this definition is still accurate, as individuals can form an ingroup based on opinions, and define this in more ideological terms (“we are against injustice”). It is argued that this happens when the inequality experienced by the disadvantaged (minority) group violates the moral standards of the advantaged (majority) group (Van Zomeren et al., 2011).

This support of the advantaged group to the cause of the minority group, is one of the most important factors to examine regarding (re)actions of the advantaged group to protests, because the political and economic power advantaged group members hold, may contribute to the success of system-challenging collective action (Brown & Ostrove, 2013; Burstein, 2003; Iyer & Leach, 2010; Mallet et al., 2008; Russell, 2011; Subasic et al., 2008). Moreover, by expressing support for the cause of the minority group, advantaged group members can encourage minority group members' participation in the system-challenging collective action (Droogendyk et al., 2016). Furthermore, confrontations by advantaged group members tend to be more effective in reducing prejudice than confrontations by minority group members (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Gulker et al., 2013).

A couple of studies have looked at support of advantaged group members to the causes of minority group collective action. An important distinction here is the type of protest of the disadvantaged, namely, normative versus nonnormative. Teixeira et al. (2020) studied the effects of normative versus nonnormative action performed by the low-status group on the support for their cause by the majority group. Multiple studies were conducted in different contexts, and it was shown that normative versus nonnormative actions lead to different perceptions in outgroup gain and social image damage. Specifically, majority groups perceive normative action and nonnormative action to differ on “strict normativity” (the extent to which the actions are perceived as a normal and appropriate way to pursue social change within the system), and on “attributions of blame to the advantaged” (the extent to which the protesters are perceived as blaming the advantaged for the inequality). In addition, normative actions were perceived as more likely to diminish intergroup inequality than to damage the majority group's social image, whereas nonnormative actions were perceived as more likely to hurt the majority group's social image than to reduce inequality. Moreover, the studies examined the role of identification with the majority group on support for protest: support for nonnormative action was lower among high identifiers compared to low identifiers with advantaged groups. No differences were found regarding support for normative actions. Interestingly, this effect could not be explained by perceived differences in legitimacy of the actions. What did explain the difference in support among high versus low identifiers, was the

higher association of nonnormative protest with social image-damage to the high status ingroup and lower association with out-group gain outcomes (compared with normative action). This was also shown in a last study in which high identifiers' support was shown to be lower in the condition where actions were presented to be more image damaging, than in the condition in which actions were presented as less image damaging. In other words, it could be concluded that nonnormative actions are less often supported by high identifiers with the advantaged group than normative actions, because they are perceived to be less likely to lead to change and more likely to damage the image of the advantaged group.

In a different study, the effects of perceived legitimacy of the protests and emotions about inequality on support by the majority group were assessed (Teixeira et al., in prep.). Specifically, a (mis)match of (un)stability of inequality with the type of actions (normative versus nonnormative) were used to measure differences in support by the majority group. As mentioned before, normative actions are often used under conditions of unstable inequality, whereas nonnormative actions are often taken when the inequality is stable (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright, 2009). In two experiments, low identifiers (less self-invested) with the majority group were more supportive when normative action was used in unstable situations, and nonnormative actions were used in stable situations (the form of protest 'matched' or was proportionate to the type of inequality; that is the circumstances of inequality justified the means of protest). This effect was mediated by perceived legitimacy of the protests and outrage about inequality. For high identifiers with the majority group, however, no differences in support were found when the form of protest or stability was manipulated. It can thus be concluded that support by the majority group depends not only on stability, type of action (normative versus nonnormative), legitimacy and outrage about inequality, but also identification with the majority group once again plays a role. Interestingly, even nonnormative actions can be supported by majority group members if identification with the majority group is low, and the type of action matches the circumstances.

What we know little about, however, is whether it makes a difference if the disadvantaged group that takes action is defined by race or religion for the support of the majority group. This research aims to get insight on the effect of racial versus religious minority group action on the supportiveness of the advantaged group. Specifically, the difference between support by the advantaged group for (non)normative actions undertaken by minority groups in order to diminish racism versus Islamophobia in Europe.

### **The current research**

As has been highlighted by the Black Lives Matter movement, racism is still very present in the world, and collective action in order to diminish this still takes place. Moreover, the Dutch Social and Cultural planning bureau (Andriessen et al., 2020) has shown that prejudice and discrimination towards racial minority groups in the Netherlands is still present. Project Implicit at Harvard University shows that racism also occurs often in European countries. What is interesting about the Black Lives Matter movement, is that many non-black individuals joined these protests and showed their support, even during a pandemic. In other words, outgroups supported the movement, even though this might question their own position in society.

Regarding Islamophobia, Allen and Nielsen (2002) mention that it has been becoming more prominent in European countries even since the terroristic attack by Al Qaida on the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001. Moreover, Strabac and Listhaug (2008) showed that prejudice against Muslims in Europe is more widespread than prejudice against any other type of immigrants, especially in Eastern Europe. These results seem to indicate that religious prejudice regarding Muslims might be more prominent in Europe than racial prejudice. Thus, Muslims in Europe are prone to becoming targets of prejudice. This even was the case before the attacks of September 11, 2001. The size of the Muslim population in the country did not affect the level of anti-Muslim prejudice. Aside from this, Velasco González et al. (2008) showed one out of two Dutch students held negative feelings towards Muslim minorities, showing there is religious prejudice regarding Islam present in the Netherlands, specifically.

The previously described prejudice and discrimination reinforces the disadvantage of less privileged groups. It is then fair to assume that this might spark certain (non)normative counterreactions by racial or Muslim minority groups in Europe. The main research question for this paper will be “What is the reaction of an advantaged group in Europe towards (non)normative actions of racial versus religious minority groups?”. We believe that differences might occur as previously mentioned research indicated that prejudice towards Muslims might be more prominent in Europe than racial prejudice. Also, we think that factors such as the perceptions of the (in)tolerance of the disadvantaged group, or the choice of being part of the disadvantaged group might affect this in such a way that religious minority groups will be less supported than racial minority groups. These expectations will be explained more in more detail below. The main variable investigated will be support for the collective action of the minority from the majority.



This research question will be examined in the context of normative and non-normative protests by Turkish inhabitants of Europe who can experience prejudice because of their racial and/or religious background.

It is reasonable to assume that main effects will arise for at least three reasons. First of all, regarding type of action undertaken by the minority group, as shown in previously mentioned research, normative actions are more often supported than nonnormative actions. This makes sense, as normative action should, by definition, be supported more than nonnormative action, since the latter involves forms of protests that do not adhere to the societal norms of acceptable protest (Teixeira et al., 2020). Secondly, regarding the framing of the minority group (race versus religion), individuals experiencing racism do not have a choice regarding their position in the minority group, because individuals cannot change their ethnicity. However, when talking about one's religion, this can be perceived as more of a choice. It is not unreasonable, then, to assume that majority groups might be less tolerant to actions undertaken by a religious minority group to reduce religious prejudice (in this case: Islamophobia). Lastly, also regarding the framing of the minority group protest, race does not have obvious ideological content (although it can be associated with cultural differences), but religion does. For example, the high social norm of tolerance in Europe might explain why there's less tolerance for intolerant religions (the majority group gathered in Europe might assume Muslims do not meet this norm because of, among other reasons, the traditional lower status of women in Islamic societies and their less tolerant views on sexuality).

Moreover, we can expect an interaction effect between the conditions, such that nonnormative Islamophobia protests are supported the least of all conditions, whereas the normative conditions will not differ significantly from each other regarding the support they gather from the majority group. It is logical to assume this because nonnormative protests performed by Muslims can trigger the prototype of "radicalism" in the majority group's minds. This prototype relates to the stereotype of jihadism and therefore creates concerns of extremism, leading to less support.

Therefore, our main hypothesis will be that (H1) it is expected that an interaction will exist for (non)normativity of the collective actions and the framing of the minority group (racism versus Islamophobia) on support. Specifically, we expect that means in support will not differ significantly between the normative conditions, but will differ significantly between the nonnormative conditions, such that support will be lowest for the nonnormative, Islamophobia condition than in the nonnormative Racial condition (i.e. an interaction effect).

As previously mentioned, we expect this effect, because religion can be seen as more of a choice than race, and therefore the religiously framed minority group's campaigns might be seen as less worthy of support, as they are more to blame for their low status in society. To test this, the factors "Choice for religion" and "Choice for race" will be measured. (H2) We expect that a main effect for choice religion and race in such a way that religion will be seen as more of a choice than race.

Furthermore, stereotypes held by the majority group member towards the minority group are of importance when looking at discrimination (Allport, 1954; LaViolette & Silvert, 1951; Saenger, 1953; Simpson & Yinger, 1965), and support for societal change (Johnson et al., 2009). Johnson and colleagues (2009) showed that priming stereotypes led to less support for policies that promoted the welfare of the stereotype's outgroup, but made no difference for support for policies that promoted the welfare of the ingroup. Thus, stereotypes can have effects on support for societal change in such a way that negative stereotypes lead to less support if the actions are meant to better the situation of the negatively stereotyped group. Here we also expect the an interaction between type of protest and framing of inequality, because nonnormative protests by religiously framed minority groups should be linked to stereotypes of aggressivity (i.e., radicalism) of religious groups, whereas this should not be the case neither for normative protest nor for racially framed protests. We, thus, expect that (H3) an interaction effect will exist for (non)normativity of the collective actions and the framing of the minority group (racism versus Islamophobia) on stereotypes. Specifically, we expect that the mean for aggression stereotypes (as these are mostly linked to radicalism) regarding the minority group will be higher in the nonnormative, Islamophobia condition, in comparison to the nonnormative, racism condition, and no differences in means will exist for the normative conditions.

This perceived radicalism can also be linked to the extent the majority group believes that the minority group (Turkish people) is intolerant. Therefore, we also measure the perceptions of outgroup (Turkish people; the protesters) intolerance. (H4) We expect that an interaction will exist for (non)normativity of the collective actions and the framing of the minority group (racism versus Islamophobia) on perceptions of intolerance. Specifically, we expect that the mean of the perceived intolerance will be higher in the nonnormative, Islamophobia condition, in comparison to the nonnormative, racism condition, and no difference in means will be seen for the normative conditions.

For exploratory reasons, we also measure some other variables shown to impact reactions to inequality reduction and protest among advantaged groups. However, as these are

not the main focus of the present research we make no specific predictions regarding the impact of our independent variables. As it was shown that identification with the majority group plays an important role for the amount of support for actions undertaken by the minority group, we also take into account this factor. It is possible that this factor will affect the main hypothesis in the same way as in the research by Teixeira et al. (2020).

Moreover, for exploratory reasons, we measure image threat perceptions. This factor has previously been shown to affect support in such a way that normative collective actions are often not perceived as social image damaging and deviating from normativity and therefore do not differ regarding support. However, nonnormative actions are more often seen as social image damaging and deviating from normativity and therefore lead to less support than normative actions, especially in high identifiers.

An alternative explanation for the support shown by majority group members, might be that they perceive the actions as more (less) legitimate in the situation. As explained before, for low identifiers, normative action in unstable situations were supported more than normative actions in stable situations, and nonnormative actions in stable situations were supported more than nonnormative actions in unstable situations (Teixeira et al., in prep.). This difference was not shown for high identifiers. Most importantly, this effect was mediated by perceived legitimacy of the protests. What might have explained the difference between high and low identifiers' support in earlier studies, is that high identifiers downgrade the legitimacy of nonnormative collective action more than low identifiers, as nonnormative action deviates from the norm upheld by the high-status group (Teixeira et al., 2020). Therefore, perceived legitimacy of the actions undertaken by the minority group will be measured for exploratory reasons, as well.

Moreover, some people are less likely than others to undertake action, or support actions to change the status quo. One might be less inclined to take action, if one believes that the system is fair (Ksenofontov & Becker, 2020). These are also called system justification beliefs. Jost et al. (2004) explained system justification as "the rationalization of unfair sociopolitical arrangements" (as mentioned in Ksenofontov & Becker, 2020). These beliefs could potentially be harmful for low-status groups, because if less people take action against the negative position of the low-status group in society, the potential power of collective action to improve their status diminishes. What is interesting, is to see whether these beliefs are affected by the (non)normativity of the racial (religious) minority group's protests. Therefore, we also keep in mind the system justification beliefs (SJB) of the participants, for exploratory reasons.

Besides, differences in social dominance orientation (SDO) can be an important factor in influencing support, too. A high social dominance orientation is described as a high support for group hierarchy (Pratto & Shih, 2000). Also, high social dominance orientation scores links to support for group-differentiating ideologies (racism, sexism, homophobia, etc.), more than low social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 2000; Pratto et al., 1994). Furthermore, when in-group and out-group pronouns were shown to participants prior to evaluating good or bad trait adjectives, people high on social dominance orientation showed implicit group prejudice (Pratto & Shih, 2000). This effect was not seen in people low in social dominance orientation. Moreover, Pratto et al. (1998) showed that a high social dominance orientation leads people to support discriminatory ideologies, which in turn influences support for policies in such a way that policies that support this discriminatory ideology are supported more, and policies that go against this ideology are supported less. Again, it is interesting to see whether this orientation is affected by the (non)normativity of the racial (religious) minority group's protests. Therefore, we also keep in mind the social dominance orientation (SDO) of the participants, for exploratory reasons.

## Method

### Participants and design

Participants for the study were first year psychology students of the University of Groningen, the Netherlands. Participating in studies was part of their course requirements. As the study was conducted in English, both the students following the Dutch programme and those following the English programme were able to participate. The sample consisted of 261 participants. Three participants were deleted from the set, because they did not fill in any of the important questions. The new set consisted of 258 participants (male:  $n=78$ ; female:  $n=178$ ; non-binary:  $n=1$ ; prefer not to say:  $n=1$ ; Age:  $M=20,19$ ;  $SD=2,034$ ; Age range: 17-30; Europeans:  $n=246$ ). The political orientations of the participants (left versus right; progressive versus conservative) were asked (left versus right:  $M=3,02$ ;  $SD=1,378$ ; progressive versus conservative:  $M=2,36$ ;  $SD=1,121$ ), as well as their religious affiliation (Christian:  $n=49$ ; Muslim:  $n=3$  (excluded; see further below); Buddhist:  $n=4$ ; Hindu:  $n=1$ ; Jewish:  $n=2$ ; Spiritual:  $n=19$ ; Atheist/Agnostic:  $n=159$ ; Other:  $n=20$ ; Missing:  $n=1$ ). Gathering the data was done through SONA Systems, in which participants could prescribe to a timeslot in order to receive 0.8 SONA-points that contributed to their studies. No restrictions were set on participation. The design of the study was a 2 (Normative versus Nonnormative actions) x 2 (Racism versus Islamophobia against Turkish immigrants) between subjects design. The level

of identification the participant has with the majority group (Europeans) was used as a continuous moderator. The main dependent variable was level of Support for the minority groups' protests/cause. In addition, we also measured some factors to check for their influence (described in more detail below). Participants were randomly allocated to one of the four conditions.

### **Method and Procedure**

The participants received an informed consent to sign (see appendix A), in which it was explained that the research studied the reactions of people to protests. The informed consent included the goal of the research, that the participants would be filling in an online questionnaire and read an online newspaper article, the duration of the study, that participants' identification remained completely anonymous and that they were allowed to stop the study at any time without consequences. It was not specifically mentioned that differences in type of action or the framing of the minority group would be researched to avoid alerting participants to the hypotheses.

**Questionnaire.** The online questionnaire was programmed in Qualtrics (see appendix B) coupled to SONA in order to give participants access to the questionnaire.

**Online newspaper article and cover story.** In order to realize the manipulations, four different newspaper articles about protests held in The Netherlands were created. The articles were photoshopped in order to make it seem like they were originally posted in The Guardian, a well-known UK newspaper with international and online editions. For normative conditions, the protests consisted of a legal demonstration, and an online petition. The non-normative conditions referred to an illegal sit-in and spamming of email accounts. In order to manipulate the framing of protest, we present one of two fictional campaigns: Stop Racism Now versus Stop Islamophobia Now, for racial and religious framed protest, respectively. The campaign was supposedly trying to diminish racism against Turkish immigrants (racial minority group) or Islamophobia against Turkish, Muslim immigrants (religious minority group) in Europe, after studies had ostensibly revealed that this kind of discrimination was prevalent in Europe. The protests were described as being held at the Institute for Global Justice in the Hague, the Netherlands. By using Europe as the region where the campaign was active and the discrimination against non-Europeans (Turkish immigrants) was present, we hoped that participants would see themselves part of the majority group (Europeans). For the full articles, see appendix C. A debriefing was shown to the participants after the study, in which it was explained that the articles were constructed and what the study was about (see appendix D).

### **Procedure**

First, participants were asked whether they gave consent for the use of their data for the study through an informed consent. Next, participants were asked to indicate their gender, age, nationality, birth country, native language, and political orientation (left versus right; progressive versus conservative). Identification of the participants with Europe was then measured. After this, the manipulation took place, using the newspaper article. After reading the article, we administered a manipulation check on the participants by asking what kind of protests were held in the article, and what type of discrimination they were protesting against. Following the manipulation check, participants were presented with scales measuring the dependent variables. After, the participants were asked to indicate their religious affiliation and lastly, were presented with a debriefing (see appendix D).

### Measures

**Demographics.** Participants were asked to indicate their gender (male; female; other; prefer not to say), their age, nationality, birth country, native language, and religious affiliation (Christian; Muslim; Buddhist; Hindu; Jewish; Spiritual; Atheist/Agnostic; Other).

**Political orientation.** Participants we asked to indicate their political orientation in two questions. The first asked participants to indicate on a 7-point (left versus right) scale whether they have predominantly left- or right-wing political views. The second asked participants to indicate on a 7-point (progressive versus conservative) scale whether they have predominantly progressive or conservative political views.

**Manipulation check.** After the manipulation, it was checked whether the manipulation was successful. This was done by asking the participants to indicate what types of protests were mentioned in the article, and what kind of discrimination the protesters were protesting against. These were multiple choice questions, in which the options for types of protest were Road-blocking, Spamming, Petitioning, Advertising articles, Sit-ins, Strikes, Demonstrations, and Setting themselves on fire. Regarding the kind of discrimination, the options were Racial, Gender, Religious, Social Economic Status (SES), and Homophobia.

**Support for protest.** To test for the attitudinal support and behavioral support intentions of the majority group to the cause/protests by the minority group, we used a scale created by Teixeira et al. (2020). Participants indicated to what extent they agreed with 14 statements. Example item: "I support [the low-status group] in their claims". Because the attitudinal and behavioral support scale were highly correlated with  $r = .663$ . We decided to put them together as one scale measuring support. Reliability:  $\alpha = .927$ .

**Identification.** For the identification measurement, the Leach et al. (2008) 14-item multidimensional identification scale was used. We referred to Europeans as the identification

group. Participants indicated their level of agreement with each item using a 7-point scale (1= not at all; 7= very much). Reliability:  $\alpha = .873$ .

**Legitimacy.** To test to what extent participants (and high versus low identifiers) perceived the type of protest held as a legitimate measure to better the low-status' position, the legitimacy scale used in Teixeira et al. (2020) was used. The scale asked participants to what extent they perceived the treatment of the low-status group as fair, reasonable, legitimate and justified (7-point scale), and to what extent they perceived the protests in the article as fair, reasonable, legitimate and justified (7-point scale). Reliability: Legitimacy of the inequality:  $\alpha = .928$ . Legitimacy of the protests:  $\alpha = .897$ .

**Image Threat.** The amount of threat participants perceived to their high-status' group's image was measured using the 6-item scale by Teixeira et al. (2020). Participants indicated to what extent they perceived the actions undertaken by the campaign to have the consequences stated in the items (7-point scale; 1= Very unlikely; 7= Very likely). Example items include "The campaign group will make Europeans seem unfair to the rest of the world."; "The campaign group will damage the reputation of Europeans.". Reliability:  $\alpha = .868$ .

**Stereotypes.** The stereotypes participants held towards Turkish people were measured using 12-items designed to assess competence, warmth, morality, and aggression, measured on 7-point scales in which participants indicated to what extent they were pleasant, warm, friendly, intelligent, competent, skillful, trustworthy, honest, sincere, aggressive, threatening, or intolerant (1= Not at all; 7= Extremely). Reliability: Warmth:  $\alpha = .902$ ; Competence:  $\alpha = .884$ ; Morality:  $\alpha = .849$ ; Aggression:  $\alpha = .784$ .

**Choice.** To test to what extent participants perceived ethnicity versus religion as a choice, or something one can't change, we formulated four statements. Participants indicated to what extent they agreed on a 7-point scale (1=Strongly disagree; 7= Strongly agree). Items were: "I think one's religion is a matter of choice."; "I think one can choose the ethnicity one identifies most with."; "One's religion (ethnicity) is something one's born with and "can't change".". Reliability: Choice religion:  $r = .434$  ; Choice race:  $r = .550$

**Perceptions of (in)tolerance of Turkish people.** To test for the perceptions people have regarding the (in)tolerance of Turkish people, we asked participants to indicate on 6 items, to what extent they could see Turkish people agreeing with the (intolerant) statements on a 7-point scale (1= Not at all; 7= Very much). Items were previously used in a master thesis by Spitaleri (2018). Example item: "Turkish people's communities should be granted legal exemption to the introduction of same-sex marriage rights.". Reliability:  $\alpha = .793$ .

**System Justification Beliefs.** System justification beliefs (SJB) was measured using a 8-item scale in which participants indicated to what extent they (dis)agreed with the statements, based on how they saw the EU at that moment (7-point scale; 1= Strongly disagree; 7= Strongly agree). Example item: “Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve.”. Reliability:  $\alpha = .820$ .

**Social Dominance Orientation.** To test for the general tendency for participants to be social dominantly oriented, we used the SDO7 8-item short scale by Ho et al. (2015). Participants to what extent they favored or opposed each item on a 7-point scale (1= Strongly oppose; 7= Strongly favor). Example items include “An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom.” ; “No one group should dominate in society.”. Reliability:  $\alpha = .832$ .

### Statistical analysis

Before analysis, we excluded non-Europeans from analysis. As we were interested in the reactions of the majority group being Europeans, non-Europeans would not be part of this group. Moreover, we excluded Muslims from analysis. This was done because Muslims would not be part of the majority group in the Islamophobia conditions, but of the minority group. Again, as we were interested in the reactions of the majority group in this research, these responses were likely to bias the results. After excluding these participants, the sample consisted of 246 participants ( $n=246$ ; Male:  $n=74$ ; Female:  $n=170$ ; Non-binary:  $n=1$ ; Prefer not to say:  $n=1$ ; Age:  $M=20,27$ ;  $SD= 2,039$ ; Age range: 17-30; Political orientation left versus right:  $M=3,06$ ;  $SD=1,390$ ; progressive versus conservative:  $M=2,35$ ;  $SD=1,114$ ; Christian:  $n=48$ ; Muslim:  $n=0$ ; Buddhist:  $n=3$ ; Hindu:  $n=0$ ; Jewish:  $n=2$ ; Spiritual:  $n=18$ ; Atheist/Agnostic:  $n=155$ ; Other:  $n=20$ ; Missing:  $n=0$ ).

With regard to the manipulation check, we found that many participants failed to correctly identify the information provided. We decided to not exclude participants from analysis based on the manipulation check, because even though participants might have not been able to identify their manipulation correctly, they still were being manipulated, and excluding them could violate the assumptions about random allocation.

## Results and discussion

The main research question was “What is the reaction of an advantaged group in Europe towards (non)normative actions of racial versus religious minority groups?”. Our main prediction was that (H1) an interaction would exist for (non)normativity of the collective actions and the framing of the minority group (racism versus Islamophobia) on



support. Specifically, we expected that means in support would not differ significantly between the normative conditions, but would differ significantly between the nonnormative conditions, where support will be lowest for the nonnormative, Islamophobia condition.

We conducted a 2 (type of action) x 2 (framing of the minority group) univariate ANOVA with the dependent variable "Support" and significance level  $\alpha=0,05$  to check for the main hypotheses. No significant main effects emerged, meaning that (non)normativity of the protests, or the framing of the minority group, did not make a difference for support. However, as expected, a significant interaction effect was seen for action type and framing of the minority group ( $F(1, 245)=4,304; p=0,039$ ). The means of support (see figure 1) seem to be rather equal in the racism and Islamophobia conditions when normative actions are undertaken (normative, race:  $M=4,224; SD= 1,215$ ; normative, religion:  $M=4,321; SD=1,127$ ). However, it seems that in the nonnormative condition, differences in means of support emerge in such a way that support goes down when the framing of the minority group was religion (Islamophobia), compared to race (racism) (nonnormative, race:  $M=4,321; SD=1,127$ ; nonnormative, religion:  $M=3,874; SD=1,219$ ).




Figure 1: Means of support by majority group members depending depending on the (non)normativity of the collective actions done by the minority group and whether the minority group is racially or religiously framed.

To test whether this effect actually emerged, we examined simple effects. Indeed, as expected (H1), for the normative conditions, no significant differences between level of support emerged depending on the framing of the minority group (racism versus Islamophobia;  $F(1,245)=0,198$ ;  $p=0,657$ ). In other words, the means of these conditions do not significantly differ. It seems that support for the cause of a minority group does not differ on the framing of the minority group when the campaign uses normative forms of collective action.

Moreover, also as expected (H1), the difference between the nonnormative conditions is significant ( $F(1,245)=6,194$ ;  $p=0,013$ ). When we look at the means for the conditions (see figure 1), we see that the mean for the nonnormative, race condition is higher than that of the nonnormative, religion condition. As expected (H1), when the campaign uses nonnormative forms of collective action, a minority group that is religiously framed (Islamophobia) gains less support from advantaged group members than when the minority group is racially framed (racism). Interestingly, also, when the framing of the minority group is religious (Islamophobia), significant differences emerged between normative versus nonnormative conditions ( $F(1, 245)=4,305$ ;  $p=0,039$ ), in such a way that religiously framed normative protests are supported more than religiously framed nonnormative protests, whereas no significant differences emerged when the framing of the minority group was racial (racism).

Regarding the explanation of this effect, we tested the effects of choice, stereotypes (aggression) and perceptions of Turkish people's intolerance. We expected that a main effect would be seen for the choice of religion and race in such a way that the mean score for religion will be higher than the mean score for race. After doing a repeated measures ANOVA with the variable "choice race versus choice religion" on the different conditions, we found a highly significant main effect of choice ( $F(1,245)=344,236$ ;  $p<0,001$ ). There are indeed significant differences between the perceptions of how much of a choice race versus religion is. When looking at the means, it can be seen that, as expected, participants more often think that religion is a choice than that race is a choice (race:  $M=3,711$ ;  $SE=0,101$ ; religion:  $M=5,932$ ;  $SE=0,065$ ). This effect could have affected the main hypothesis in such a way that the support in the religious conditions is lower than in the racial conditions, as religiously framed minority groups might be seen as more blameworthy for their low status than racially framed minority groups (because religiously framed minority groups choose to be part of this religion, and therefore can be held more accountable than racially framed minority groups,

which have less of a choice in the matter). Important to note, however, is that this effect does not explain wholly the interaction, as it does not explain why the normative, religious condition is not significantly supported less than the normative, racism condition. However, it could be a contributing factor to the interaction.




Figure 2: Means of “choice for race” versus “choice for religion” in the racially framed and the religiously framed conditions.

Also, there was a marginally significant interaction effect for the framing of the minority group with “choice race versus choice religion” ( $F(1,245)=3,789$ ;  $p=0,053$ ). When looking at the means, it seems that there might be a significant difference in the scores on choice of religion between the religiously framed conditions ( $M=5,786$ ;  $SE=0,090$ ) and the racially framed conditions ( $M=6,079$ ;  $SE=0,093$ ), in such a way that in the racially framed conditions, participants think that religion is more of a choice, than in the religiously framed conditions (see figure 2). The other means seem to differ less (scores on choice for race in the racially framed conditions:  $M=3,625$ ;  $SE=0,145$ ; scores on choice for race in the religiously framed conditions:  $M=3,798$ ;  $SE=0,093$ ). When doing a 2 (type of action) x 2 (framing of the minority group) univariate ANOVA with dependent variable “choice religion”, we see that there is a significant main effect for the framing of the conditions ( $F(1,245)=5,134$ ;  $p=0,024$ ). The means show that religion is indeed seen as more of a choice in the racially framed

conditions, than in the religiously framed conditions. This is not unexpected, as the racially framed conditions set a base for the participants to compare the choice of religion with, where race is less of a choice. Therefore, they might think that religion is more of a choice in contrast with race, and they score higher on the choice for religion. In comparison, the religiously framed conditions do not set this base for participants where the framing is less of a choice than religion, and therefore they do not contrast how much of a choice religion versus race is, and, thus, they score lower on the choice for religion. No significant effects emerged when the dependent variable "choice race" was used, meaning that there were no significant differences for the perceived choice of race between conditions.

For the effect of stereotypes, we expected that the nonnormative protests by a religiously (Islamophobia) framed minority group, would be linked to radicalism, and therefore, we expected that (H3) an interaction effect would exist for (non)normativity of the collective actions and the framing of the minority group (racism versus Islamophobia) on stereotypes. Specifically, we expected that the mean for aggression stereotypes regarding the minority group would be higher in the nonnormative, Islamophobia condition, in comparison to the nonnormative, racism condition, and no differences in means would exist for the normative conditions. To test this, we did a 2 (type of actions) x 2 (framing of the minority group) univariate ANOVA, ( $\alpha=0,05$ ) with the dependent variable of aggression stereotypes. No significant main effects emerged, so (non)normativity of the actions or framing of the minority group (racial versus religious) made no difference on aggression stereotypes. However, a marginally significant interaction effect emerged ( $F(1,245)=3,414$ ;  $p=0,066$ ). When looking at the means (see figure 3), it seems that the largest differences are seen in the racially framed conditions, in such a way that in the normative racially framed condition, aggression stereotypes are higher than in the nonnormative racially framed condition (normative, race:  $M=3,622$ ;  $SD=1,055$ ; nonnormative, race:  $M=3,228$ ;  $SD=1,112$ ). The other means seem to be closer to one another (normative, religion:  $M=3,302$ ;  $SD=1,15$ ; nonnormative, religion:  $M=3,423$ ;  $SD=1,06$ ). Still, it is noticeable that the nonnormative, religion condition shows the second highest score on aggression stereotypes.




Figure 3: Means of aggression stereotypes by majority group members depending on the (non)normativity of the collective actions done by the minority group and whether the minority group is racially or religiously framed.

We did a simple effects test ( $\alpha=0,05$ ) to test where the differences lie. No significant differences in aggression stereotypes emerged between the normative conditions or between nonnormative conditions, depending on the framing of the protests. However, a significant difference in aggression stereotypes was seen when looking at the differences in aggression stereotypes between the racially framed conditions, depending on (non)normativity of the used actions (no significant difference was seen in the religious conditions;  $p=0,050$ ).

Unexpectedly, and not in line with our hypothesis (H3), when looking at the means (see figure 3), we can conclude that aggression stereotypes are marginally significantly higher when the campaign is racially framed and used normative forms of protest, than when the campaign is racially framed and uses nonnormative forms of protest. No significant differences are present for other comparisons.

Regarding the effect of the perceptions participants had on the (in)tolerance of the minority group (Turkish people), we expected that (H4) an interaction would exist for (non)normativity of the collective actions and the framing of the minority group (racism versus Islamophobia) on the perceptions of (in)tolerance of Turkish people. Specifically, we expected that the mean of the perceptions of intolerance of Turkish people would be higher in

the nonnormative, Islamophobia condition, in comparison to the nonnormative, racism condition, and no difference in means would be seen for the normative conditions. We did a 2 (type of actions) x 2 (framing of the minority group) univariate ANOVA with the dependent variable being “perceptions on (in)tolerance of the minority group” to check this hypothesis. However, unexpectedly, and not in line with our hypothesis, no significant effects emerged, meaning that the perceptions on the intolerance of Turkish people did not differ between conditions.

When checking the effects of the exploratory variables, we did multiple 2 (type of actions) x 2 (framing of the minority group) univariate ANOVA's, changing the dependent variable depending on the variable we were interested in. A marginally significant main effect for image threat depending on the framing of the minority group emerged ( $F(1,245)=3,135$ ;  $p=0,078$ ). When looking at the means, it seems that image threat perceptions are higher in the racially framed conditions ( $M=3,556$ ;  $SE=0,098$ ), than in the religiously framed conditions ( $M=3,312$ ;  $SE=0,096$ ). This would mean that participants feel more threatened about the image of Europeans when the minority group is framed in terms of race, than when the minority group is framed in terms of religion (Islam). This is not unexpected, as racism might be seen as less justifiable than Islamophobia (because race is seen of less of a choice than religion, and also because Islam might be linked to radicalism).

A marginally significant interaction effect emerged for system justification beliefs (SJB; ( $F(1,245)=3,817$ ;  $p=0,052$ ). When looking at the means (see figure 4), it seems that the largest differences are present between the religious conditions (normative, religious:  $M=3,833$ ;  $SD=0,822$ ; nonnormative, religious:  $M=4,151$ ;  $SD=0,786$ ), whereas smaller differences are present between the other comparisons (normative, race:  $M=4,031$ ;  $SD=0,999$ ; nonnormative, race:  $M=3,881$ ;  $SD=1,118$ ). Indeed, when doing a simple effects test comparing the means in SJB depending on the framing of the minority group within the normative or the nonnormative condition, no significant effects emerged. However, when doing a simple effects test comparing the means in SJB depending on the (non)normativity of the actions within the racial or the religiously framed condition, a marginally significant effect ( $p=0,059$ ) can be seen for the differences in means of SJB between the normative religiously framed condition and the nonnormative religiously framed condition. When looking at the means, we can conclude that, when the protesters are religiously framed, system justification beliefs are marginally significantly lower when the campaigns use normative actions, than when the campaigns use nonnormative actions. No significant differences in means are present between the normative racially framed condition and nonnormative racially framed

condition. Therefore, we can also conclude that the difference in system justification beliefs seems not to be present for other conditions. It seems that system justification beliefs can be influenced by the (non)normativity of the used actions only when the protesters are religiously framed (Islamophobia).




Figure 4: Means of system justification beliefs (SJB) by majority group members depending on the (non)normativity of the collective actions done by the minority group and whether the minority group is racially or religiously framed.

Furthermore, social dominance orientation (SDO), showed a marginally significant interaction effect ( $F(1,245)=2,851$ ;  $p=0,093$ ). When looking at the means (see figure 5), it seems that the largest difference is present between the racial conditions, where the normative condition has higher SDO scores than the nonnormative condition (normative, racial:  $M=2,815$ ;  $SD=0,99$ ; nonnormative, racial:  $M=2,483$ ;  $SD=1,06$ ). The other comparisons show smaller differences (normative, religious:  $M=2,661$ ;  $SD=0,994$ ; nonnormative, religious:  $M=2,762$ ;  $SD=0,974$ ). We performed simple effects tests to check this. Indeed, the differences between the SDO scores in the normative versus the nonnormative racially framed conditions seem to be marginally significant ( $p=0,072$ ). When the campaign is racially framed, SDO scores seem to be marginally significantly higher when normative forms of protest are used, in comparison to when nonnormative forms of protests are used. Social dominance orientation

seems to change depending on the (non)normativity of the protests when these are racially framed. This difference seems not to be present for other conditions, as no significant effects emerged for the differences between the SDO scores in the normative versus the nonnormative religiously framed conditions, and also not for the differences between the SDO scores depending on the framing of the minority group within the normative or the nonnormative conditions.




Figure 5: Means of social dominance orientation (SDO) by majority group members depending on the (non)normativity of the collective actions done by the minority group and whether the minority group is racially or religiously framed.

### General discussion

The aim of this study was to investigate the effects of the form of protest and the framing (racial versus religious) of a minority group protesting on the support of advantaged group members to the cause of this minority group. The forms of protest were either normative or nonnormative and the framing of the minority group was either Turkish immigrants that protested racism or Turkish immigrants that protested Islamophobia, creating four conditions. The advantaged group consisted of Europeans.

It was important to investigate the support by advantaged group members to the cause of minority group members, as majority group members can make a major contribution to the



success of the cause. First of all, advantaged group members hold political and economic power that may contribute to the success of the system-challenging collective action (Brown & Ostrove, 2013; Burstein, 2003; Iyer & Leach, 2010; Mallet et al., 2008; Russell, 2011; Subasic et al., 2008). Second of all, advantaged group members can encourage minority group members to participate in the actions (Droogendyk et al., 2016). Not the least of all, advantaged group members' confrontations towards other advantaged group members that are prejudiced tend to be more effective at reducing this prejudice than confrontations by minority group members (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Gulker et al., 2013).

Another important reason to do this investigation was that it is not yet clear whether support by majority groups members differs as a function of the framing of the minority group. Specifically, differences in support with regard to racial versus religious profile of the minority group has not been researched yet. It is important to know more about this, because if differences are shown, this means that some minority groups are at more of a disadvantage than others on gaining equality, as they gain less support by advantaged group members (that can be of major attribution to the success of the cause).

We carried out a 2 (normative versus nonnormative) x 2 (racial versus religious) between subjects study, in which participants were randomly allocated to one of four conditions. We expected (H1) that an interaction would exist for (non)normativity of the collective actions and the framing of the minority group (racism versus Islamophobia) on support. Specifically, we expected that means in support would not differ significantly between the normative conditions, but would differ significantly between the nonnormative conditions, where support would be lowest for the nonnormative, Islamophobia condition. We expected this effect, because religion can be seen as more of a choice than race, and therefore the religiously framed minority groups might be seen as less worthy of support. In other words, (H2) we expected that a main effect would be seen for choice religion and race in such a way that the mean score for religion would be higher than the mean score for race.

We also expected the main hypothesis, because religiously framed minority groups, specifically nonnormative Muslim ones, can be linked to radicalism. Therefore, (H3) we expected that an interaction effect would exist for (non)normativity of the collective actions and the framing of the minority group (racism versus Islamophobia) on stereotypes. Specifically, we expected that the mean for aggression stereotypes regarding the minority group would be higher in the nonnormative, Islamophobia condition, in comparison to the nonnormative, racism condition, and no differences in means would be seen for the normative conditions.

As this perceived radicalism can also be linked to the perceptions the majority group has regarding the ideological/religious (in)tolerance of the minority group (Turkish people), we expected that (H4) an interaction would exist for the (non)normativity of the collective actions and the framing of the minority group (racism versus Islamophobia) on perceptions of Turkish people's intolerance. Specifically, we expected that the mean of the perceived Turkish people's intolerance would be higher in the nonnormative, Islamophobia condition, in comparison to the nonnormative, racism condition, and no difference in means would be seen for the normative conditions.

For exploratory reasons, we also measured identification with the majority group, image threat perceptions, legitimacy, system justification beliefs, and social dominance orientation. We made no predictions regarding those variables, since these had not yet been investigated within this context and we did not have the power to measure them.

Our participants ( $n=246$ ) were recruited from first-year Psychology students at the RUG through SONA-systems, and filled in an online questionnaire in Qualtrics. After giving informed consent, participants were asked to answer questions about their demographics, political orientation and their identification with Europe. They then read one of the four (constructed) newspaper articles, depending on their condition. After, participants were asked to fill in questions about the other variables, asked what their religious affiliation was, and given a debriefing.

Our results showed that, in accordance with H1, when the minority group uses nonnormative forms of collective action and is religiously framed (Muslim), their campaigns gain less support from the advantaged group (Europeans) than when the minority group is racially framed. Moreover, no difference in support by the advantaged group to the cause of the minority group is seen when normative forms of action are used by the, either racially or religiously, framed minority group. Besides this, no difference in support by the advantaged group to the cause of the minority group is seen when the minority group is racially framed and uses either normative or nonnormative forms of protests. However, support by the advantaged group to the cause of the minority group was higher when normative actions were used and the minority group was religiously framed, than when nonnormative actions were used and the minority group was religiously framed.

Also, in accordance with H2, we found a significant main effect for choice of race versus choice of religion. Results showed that religion is seen as more of a choice than race. This might have affected the results so that the religiously framed conditions are supported less often than racially framed minority groups, as religiously framed minority groups can be

seen as more blameworthy for their low status, and methods to protest this, than racially framed minority groups. Moreover, we found that the framing of the minority group affected the scores on the choice for religion in such a way that, in the racially framed conditions, religion is seen as more of a choice than in the religiously framed conditions. This can be attributed to the contrasts participants make regarding the racial framing of their condition and how much of a choice that is in comparison to religion. We think that these contrasts were not made in the religiously framed conditions.

Unexpectedly, hypotheses (H3) and (H4) seem not to be supported. Aggression stereotypes only showed one marginally significant effect, whereby aggression stereotypes were higher when the campaign was racially framed and used normative forms of protest, than when the campaign was racially framed and used nonnormative forms of protest. It did not matter significantly whether the campaign was racially or religiously framed, nor the actions used that were normative or nonnormative, for the aggression stereotypes the majority group held. A reason for this might be that the aggression stereotype might also not be compatible with people's perceptions on radicals. Whereas aggression might be linked to radicals, this sole measurement of the trait might not be complicated enough to fit the image people have of radicals. The marginally significant effect of highest aggression stereotypes in the normative racial condition could be explained by reasoning that people might think it is legitimate for those that are racially discriminated against to react aggressively to this. Noteworthy, also, is that the second (non-significantly) highest mean on aggression stereotypes emerged in the nonnormative religiously framed condition.

Moreover, perceptions on the (in)tolerance of Turkish people showed no significant effects. In sum, whether the campaign was racially or religiously framed, and used actions that were normative or nonnormative of nature for the perceptions the majority group held regarding the (in)tolerance of the minority group (Turkish people) produced no clear differences on this measure. Reasons this effect was not shown can be that the measurement of (in)tolerance of Turkish people did not encompass the perceptions of religious radicalism or the perceptions of religious radical ideology in Turkish people that we wanted to measure. The used measurement solely focused on perceptions of (in)tolerance Turkish people have; the perceived Turkish tolerance towards homosexuals or other ideologies.

When looking at the exploratory variables, we found a marginally significant main effect for image threat on framing of the minority group. This effect showed that participants might feel more threatened about the image of Europeans when the minority group is framed in terms of race, than when the minority group is framed in terms of religion (Islam). We

think this might be the case because racism might be seen as less justifiable than Islamophobia. This might also have partially contributed to the interaction, as people might try to better their image by supporting the racially framed groups. However, it does not explain the whole interaction, in which the religiously framed normative condition scored (relatively) high on support, also.

Furthermore, system justification beliefs by the advantaged group seem to be susceptible to the (non)normativity of the collective actions the minority group uses, in such a way that, when the minority group is religiously framed (Muslim), system justification beliefs are marginally significantly lower when the campaign uses normative actions, than when the campaign uses nonnormative actions. We could therefore reason that, when nonnormative actions are used in religiously framed protests, more system justification beliefs might arise. This could be a defence strategy against the theorized trigger of nonnormative, religiously framed protests to the prototype of "radicalism". This marginally significant effect could partially have contributed to the found interaction, as the high system justification beliefs might have led to lower support in the nonnormative, religiously framed condition (because people that justify the system are less inclined to support actions that challenge the status quo).

Also, social dominance orientation seems to change depending on the (non)normativity of the protests, in such a way that, when the minority group is racially framed, social dominance orientation scores seems to be marginally significantly higher when normative forms of protest are used, in comparison to when nonnormative forms of protests are used.

Taken together, we can conclude that the framing of the minority group in combination with the (non)normativity of the collective actions used, can affect support, aggression stereotypes, system justification beliefs, and social dominance orientation by majority group members. Specifically, according to this research, it is important for the majority group of Europeans whether the minority group protests against racism or Islamophobia and uses (non)normative forms of collective action to do this. This is important to know, because it shows that some minority groups that use nonnormative actions are at a disadvantage when it comes to achieving equality, as they gain less support by majority group members (who can be of major contribution). Moreover, it shows that people's perceptions of whether society must change are affected, in such a way that some groups are less supported in their cause or actually might cause the majority group to justify the system more (instead of

the goal of the protesters, which is causing people to justify the system less) when they use certain types of actions, which is also a disadvantage for these minority groups.

This research was not perfect, and there are points for improvement. First of all, the reliability of the choice scales was rather low. It is interesting to see whether different effects emerge when these are reliable scales. Secondly, the statistical power of this study was not high enough to test for moderators. It is interesting to see whether, for example, identification would have a moderating influence on the effects. Moreover, the measurements used for perceptions on radicalism (aggression stereotypes and perceptions of (in)tolerance of Turkish people), might not have been sufficient enough. Future research should try to use or make better measurements for this cause. Also, the number of participants was not high enough to make reliable conclusions. Not the least of all, the pool of participants consisted only of first year Psychology students at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. Obviously, this sample is not representative for all Europeans, so the conclusions can not be concluded to be representative. Notably, many of our effects were only marginally significant, so caution should be kept in mind when interpreting these. Successive research should see whether these effects are significant when more statistical power is present.

Future research could investigate whether the same effects emerge when looking at other majority groups, and other framings of minority groups. It is, for example, interesting to test for differences in religious framing that is not Muslim and one that is Muslim, to see whether the same effects emerge when the factor of choice regarding joining the group might be present in both conditions. Moreover, future research can look at the effects of other variables that have been shown to be important regarding support to the cause of the minority group by majority group members, such as zero-sum beliefs (Stefaniak et al., 2020).

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## Appendix

## Appendix A: Informed consent

**INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESEARCH**  
**“Reactions to protest” PSY-2021-S-0126**

**Ø Why do I receive this information?** You are being invited to take part in this research project. Before you decide to participate, you must know that this project has been ethically approved by the Ethics Committee of Psychology of the University of Groningen. This research project aims to investigate how you perceive a protest in the media by reading about one from an article published by The Guardian. The start date of the project is 02-04-2021 to finish on 15-05-2021. The study is conducted by A. Hopmans and Prof. Russell Spears.

**Ø Do I have to participate in this research?** Participation in the research is voluntary. However, your consent is needed. Therefore, please read this information carefully. Only afterwards you decide if you want to participate. If you decide to not participate, you do not need to explain why, and there will be no negative consequences for you. You have this right at all times, including after you have consented to participate in the research.

**Ø Why this research?** This project aims to investigate the emotions and thoughts a news article about a protest elicits (see next question).

**Ø What do we ask of you during the research?** First, we ask you to read the present information and if you agree, sign the consent in order to participate. Then, you will be asked to complete a web-based questionnaire which we estimate to take 15-20 minutes. The research has three parts, first a questionnaire about general information and group membership (three minutes), then an article about a protest located in The Netherlands (seven minutes), and finally, a questionnaire about your emotions and thoughts elicited by the article (five minutes).

In the first part, the survey about general information and group membership will ask about your background. Then, an article will inform you about a protest that has occurred in The Netherlands and the last survey will ask you about what you feel after you read the article.

**Ø What are the consequences of participation?** Whilst there are no immediate benefits for those people participating in the project, it is hoped that this work will have a beneficial impact on how we understand the reactions that people produce for reading something about their society. Also, if you decide to participate in this research, we inform you that you are not going to feel any disadvantages or discomfort. The potential psychological harm or distress will be the same as any experienced in everyday life.

**Ø How will we treat your data?** In order to grant you your SONA-points, we need to gather your SONA-number. However, after granting you the points, your SONA-number will be deleted from our files and all the information that we collect about you during this research will be kept strictly confidential. You will not be able to be identified or identifiable in any reports or publications. Any data collected about you in the online questionnaire will be stored online along with other participants in a form protected by passwords and other relevant security processes and technologies. You will not be identified in any report or publication. If

you wish to know more about this study, please email us using the email addresses mentioned below.

**Ø What else do you need to know?** You may always ask questions about the research. You can do so by emailing (*a.hopmans@student.rug.nl*) the principal investigator and Russell Spears (*r.spears@rug.nl*).

Do you have questions or concerns regarding your rights as a research participant? For this, you may also contact the Ethics Committee of Psychology of the University of Groningen: *ecp@rug.nl*.

Do you have questions or concerns regarding your privacy, or regarding the handling of your personal data? For this, you may also contact the Data Protection Officer of the University of Groningen: *privacy@rug.nl*.

As a research participant, you have the right to a copy of this research information.

I have read the information about the research and I have had the chance to ask questions about it.

I understand what the research is about, what is being asked of me, which consequences participation can have, how my data will be handled, that the personal data I provide will be handled anonymously after being granted my SONA-credits, and what my rights are.

I understand that participation in the research is voluntary. I myself choose to participate. I can stop participating at any moment. If I stop, I do not need to explain why. Stopping will have no negative consequences for me.

The researcher declares that the participant has been extensively informed about the research.

Below I indicate what I am consenting to.

Consent to participate in the research:

**If you do not consent or want to withdraw you can quit the questionnaire now without any consequences.**

[ ] Yes, I consent to participate, and to the processing of my personal data as described within the information sheet. (1)

## Appendix B: Scales

**SONA:**

Please indicate your **SONA**-number

---

**Gender:**

I am a

- Male (1)
- Female (2)
- Other: (3) \_\_\_\_\_
- Prefer not to say (4)

**Age:**

Please indicate your age.

---

**Nationality:**

Please indicate your nationality.

---

**Birth country:**

Please indicate your birth country.

---

**Language:**

Please indicate your native language.

---



It is pleasant to be European. (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Being European gives me a good feeling. (7)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I often think about the fact that I am European. (8)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The fact that I am European is an important part of my identity. (9)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Being European is an important part of how I see myself (10)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I have a lot in common with the average European. (11)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am similar to the average European. (12)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Europeans have a lot in common with each other. (13)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Europeans are very similar to each other. (14)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**Introduction to the newspaper article:**

Next you will see a newspaper article from The Guardian (UK). The article focuses on a protest held in the Netherlands by a campaign that operates in Europe. Please read the article carefully because after the article we will ask you some questions about it and you will not be able to go back to previous screens.

**Manipulation checks:**

What kind of protest action(s) did the campaign organize? Multiple answers are possible.

- Road-blocking (1)
- Spamming (2)
- Petitioning (3)
- Advertising articles (4)
- Sit-ins (5)
- Strikes (6)
- Demonstrations (7)
- Setting themselves on fire (8)

What kind of discrimination were they protesting against?

- Racial (1)
- Gender (2)
- Religious (3)
- Social Economic Status (SES) (4)
- Homophobia (5)







personnel towards Turkish people. (7)							
Keep watch while somebody spray paints the campaign name on the walls of an abandoned building. (8)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Join a road-block organized by the campaign. (9)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Avoid volunteering information on illegal activity by supporters of the campaign that you have witnessed (e.g., as a bystander at demonstrations) or when questioned by police. (10)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**Legitimacy of the inequality scale:**

To what extent do you think that the treatment described by the participants in the 2020 study that is mentioned in the article is...

	1 (1)	2 (2)	3 (3)	4 (4)	5 (5)	6 (6)	7 (7)	
Unfair	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Fair
Unreasonable	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Reasonable
Illegitimate	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Legitimate
Unjustified	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Justified

---















No one group should dominate in society. (4)

It is unjust to try to make groups equal. (5)

Group equality should not be our primary goal. (6)

We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed. (7)

We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. (8)

**Religious affiliation:**

How would you best describe your religious affiliation?

- Christian (1)
- Muslim (2)
- Buddhist (3)
- Hindu (4)
- Jewish (5)
- Spiritual (6)
- Atheist/Agnostic (7)
- Other (8)

Appendix C: Newspaper articles

**Normative, Racial:**



**Protesters address increase in racism**



▲ Protesters holding signs during the event, The Hague. Photograph: Thomas de Haan/AP

A 2020 [study](#) by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) has shocked the European Union after the results indicated a large increase of racism towards people with a Turkish background by the police and security personnel in Europe since 2018. These data demonstrated that, in 2020, people with a Turkish background were two times more likely to suffer from discrimination by police than they were in 2018. The study combined data on racism experienced in airport security checks, police stop and search in the street, and being stopped while driving. The much higher reported rates of these checks for people of colour compared to Whites points to racism by police-officers and security staff in European countries. The chances of being arrested were also significantly higher for Turkish people than for others, and this difference has increased (by 10%) over the past two years. The [results](#) came out after attention had been brought to the concern that racism, rather than receding seems to be on the rise. Especially concerning is that this is true of security services intended to protect citizen's rights.

The study prompted the Turkish anti-racism campaign End Racism Now! (ERN), active since 2016, to protest about the way in which security checks are performed in Europe and the use of racial profiling. Last Tuesday, ERN organised a demonstration in front of the Institute for Global Justice in The Hague to highlight this problem. Since April 2020, ERN also protested against racism in Europe by collecting signatures for an online petition, with the goal of introducing random selection of people to be screened at airports, instead of selection by police and security personnel themselves, as is current practice. ERN hopes to hand in the petition by the end of 2021 to the Institute for Global Justice in The Hague. Their general goal is to highlight racism against Turkish immigrants in Europe. The campaign has received supporters all over Europe, but has not yet received the attention in the press and media it deserves claimed a spokesperson for ERN.



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Protesters address increase in Islamophobia



▲ Protesters holding signs during the event, The Hague. Photograph: Thomas de Haan/AP

A 2020 [study](#) by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) has shocked the European Union after the results indicated a large increase of discrimination against Turkish Muslims by the police and security personnel in Europe since 2018. These data demonstrated that, in 2020, Turkish Muslims were two times more likely to suffer from discrimination by police than they were in 2018. The study combined data on Islamophobia experienced in airport security checks, police stop and search in the street, and being stopped while driving. The much higher reported rates of these checks for Turkish Muslims compared to others points to religious prejudice by police-officers and security staff in European countries. The chances of being arrested were also significantly higher for Turkish Muslims than for others, and this difference has increased (by 10%) over the past two years. The [results](#) came out after attention had been brought to the concern that that religious intolerance and Islamophobia, rather than receding seems to be on the rise. Especially concerning is that this is true of security services intended to protect citizen's rights.

The study prompted the Turkish anti-Islamophobia campaign End Islamophobia Now! (EIN), active since 2016, to protest about the way in which security checks are performed in Europe and the use of racial profiling. Last Tuesday, EIN organised a demonstration in front of the Institute for Global Justice in The Hague to highlight this problem. Since April 2020, EIN also protested against Islamophobia in Europe by collecting signatures for an online petition, with the goal of introducing random selection of people to be screened at airports, instead of selection by police and security personnel themselves as is current practice. ERN hopes to hand in the petition by the end of 2021 to the Institute for Global Justice in The Hague. Their general goal is to highlight discrimination against Turkish immigrants in Europe based on their religion. The campaign has received supporters all over Europe, but has not yet received the attention in the press and media it deserves claimed a spokesperson for EIN.



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## Protesters attack increase in racism

▲ Protesters holding signs during the event, The Hague. Photograph: Thomas de Haan/AP

A 2020 [study](#) by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) has shocked the European Union after the results indicated a large increase of racism towards people with a Turkish background by the police and security personnel in Europe since 2018. These data demonstrated that, in 2020, people with a Turkish background were two times more likely to suffer from discrimination by police than they were in 2018. The study combined data on racism experienced in airport security checks, police stop and search in the street, and being stopped while driving. The much higher reported rates of these checks for people of colour compared to Whites points to racism by police-officers and security staff in European countries. The chances of being arrested were also significantly higher for Turkish people than for others, and this difference has increased (by 10%) over the past two years. The [results](#) came out after attention had been brought to the concern that racism, rather than receding seems to be on the rise. Especially concerning is that this is true of security services intended to protect citizen's rights.

The study prompted the Turkish anti-racism campaign End Racism Now! (ERN), active since 2016, to protest about the way in which security checks are performed in Europe and the use of racial profiling. Last Tuesday, ERN organised an illegal blockade in front of the Institute for Global Justice in The Hague to highlight this problem. Since April 2020, ERN also protested against racism in Europe by spamming the employees of the Institute of Global Justice, with the goal of introducing random selection of people to be screened at airports, instead of selection by police and security personnel themselves, as is current practice. Their general goal is to highlight racism against Turkish immigrants in Europe. The campaign has received supporters all over Europe, but has not yet received the attention in the press and media it deserves claimed a spokesperson for ERN.

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**Protesters attack increase in Islamophobia**



▲ Protesters holding signs during the event, The Hague. Photograph: Thomas de Haan/AP

A 2020 [study](#) by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) has shocked the European Union after the results indicated a large increase of discrimination against Turkish Muslims by police-officers in Europe since 2018. The data demonstrated that, in 2020, Turkish Muslims were two times more likely to suffer from discrimination by police than they were in 2018. The study combined data on Islamophobia by police experienced in airport security checks, stops in the streets, and being stopped while driving. The much higher reported rates of these checks for Turkish Muslims compared to others points to religious prejudice by police-officers in European countries. It was also shown that chances of being arrested were significantly higher for Turkish Muslims than for others, and this difference also increased (by 10%) over the past two years. The [results](#) came out after attention had been brought to the concern that religious intolerance and Islamophobia, rather than receding seems to be on the rise.

The study prompted the Turkish anti-Islamophobia campaign End Islamophobia Now! (EIN), active since 2016, to protest about the way in which security checks are performed in Europe and the use of religious profiling. Last Tuesday, EIN organised an illegal blockade in front of the Institute for Global Justice in The Hague to highlight this problem. Since April 2020, EIN also protested against Islamophobia in Europe by spamming the employees of the Institute of Global Justice, with the goal of introducing random selection of people to be screened at airports, instead of selection by police and security personnel themselves as is current practice. Their general goal is to highlight discrimination against Turkish immigrants in Europe based on their religion. The campaign has received supporters all over Europe, but has not yet received the attention in the press and media it deserves claimed a spokesperson for EIN.



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## Appendix D: Debriefing

### **Debriefing**

Thank you for participating in this research. This research investigated the differences in supportiveness people feel towards protests held by minority groups. The article you read was composed by us. You participated in one of four conditions. The first condition included a legal protest addressing racism. Condition two included a legal protest addressing Islamophobia. The third and fourth conditions both included illegal protests, addressing racism and Islamophobia, respectively. We were interested in the differences in supportiveness for racial protests, versus religious protests. We expected that people show more support for legal protests as opposed to illegal protests, as well as that more support will be shown to protests about racial discrimination as opposed to religious discrimination. If you wish to receive more information, please contact [a.hopmans@student.rug.nl](mailto:a.hopmans@student.rug.nl).