"He's Evil and I Hate Him!": Evilness Attributions and the Experience of Hate Feelings

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Abstract

The experience of hate feelings tends to be multifaceted and morally ambiguous, with many individuals struggling to admit to feeling hate towards someone. For many years, the concepts of hate and evilness have been linked together, with previous research finding that people are quicker to hate someone if they perceive them as evil. With this study, we aimed to investigate further the role of evilness attributions in feeling hate towards different moral transgressors and if there existed an interaction between the type of transgressors and evilness attributions explaining hate feelings towards them. We expected that the type of transgression and evilness would predict hate and that they would interact. Participants (N=220) were exposed to 4 moral transgressions and asked to rate their hate feelings based on the Passionate Hate Scale (PHS), as well as whether the participant thought that the transgressor was born evil. Results show that the transgression condition predicted hate and evilness attribution did indeed explain hate feelings, but that no interaction was present between the two variables. These findings are relevant for understanding how evil and hate may present themselves in judging an individual.

Keywords: hate, evilness, moral transgressions, morality, social psychology

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When one asks whether a person 'hates' something (or someone), a common response is "Hate is a strong word". Bearing a negative connotation, hate has been agreed upon to be complicated, and as a result, people choose not to label their hatred as 'hate'. Little is understood why this is the case. Hate tends to be quite multifaceted– and can be experienced in various manners. It can be accompanied by intense feelings and a desire to act upon them (Sternberg, 2003), or something more stable and relying on cognition (Pretus et al., 2022).

Targets of hate are typically viewed as being evil (Pretus et al., 2022); this inextricable link is demonstrated to be present in both laypeople and researchers. In an unpublished study by Burris (2022), this link was found when matching evil symbols and then completing an implicit word association task. If participants were in the evil symbols condition, then their completion of a word fragment HA_E as 'hate' was nearly twice as likely (49%) than in the neutral and religious symbols conditions. Furthermore, these concepts are connected as they arise from negative moral appraisals of transgressions: when harm is thought to stem from an evil character within the transgressor, then the individual will respond by feeling hatred (Pretus et al., 2022).

There is still a research gap, however, on how hate and evilness relate to each other in different situational contexts, as well as how reluctant people are to disclose their hate and attributions of evil to others. Our current research aims to diminish this gap by investigating the interaction of hate feelings and evilness attribution towards targets involved in different moral transgressions. Hence, the research question that will be explored is: "What is the role of the attributions of 'evilness' on the hate feelings people experience towards different moral transgressors?".

Hate

Many arguments by researchers have led to an unclear and incomplete definition of what exactly hate entails. This has been the case since the time of philosophers such as Aristotle and Spinoza (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008), and has not changed with modern research – with hate described as an emotion (Aumer-Ryan & Hatfield, 2007), a sentiment (Vendrall Ferran, 2021) and as a motive (Burris, 2022). But despite these disagreements, it has been accepted that it is universally felt, with many cross-cultural current events triggered by hate feelings (Baumeister & Butz, 2005). A study by Fehr and Russell (1984) discovered that when asking participants to list emotions freely, hate was the second most frequently listed example, confirming the importance of the concept of hate.

Although hate is widely recognized, the separation between hate and dislike has proven to be difficult to distinguish, with the definition of hate in Webster's New World College Dictionary as "to have strong dislike (…) for" (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008). It has been argued that morality might serve as the differential factor between these two concepts, which Pretus et al. (2022) investigated. They conducted multiple studies to see whether hate differed from dislike based on the level of morality involved and found that the differences in individuals' conceptualization of hate and dislike were indeed affected by their moral beliefs and emotions, even when the relationship between morality and negativity was controlled for. In other words, hatred was more felt when objects violated the core moral beliefs of participants (Pretus et al., 2022). We expect with the current research that certain moral violations, ones more salient to the participant, will trigger more hate than others.

Hate is also distinguishable from dislike by intent to harm – they wish to "destroy or diminish the object's wellbeing" (Burris, 2022). Evidence for this motivational component of hate is best seen in research by Rempel et al (2019). In their first study, participants were asked to rate 52 statements based on how well they represented a good example of hate. They found that not only 'wishing death upon the target' rates the highest, but that the desire to

harm was one of three big themes and best captured the essence of hate (Rempel et al., 2019). In the second study, 'thought quotes' directed toward a target which included the desire to harm were rated higher than when this desire was not present.

Psychological theories of hate are said to be limited and few (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008), due to a lack of agreement on the definition of hate. However, one theory of how hate manifests which serves as a foundational basis is the triangular theory of hate (Sternberg, 2003). The triangular theory of hate explains that hate follows a similar triangulation as that of love, and constitutes an interaction between the negation of intimacy, passion, and commitment (Sternberg, 2003), of which seven types of hate can exist based on the presence of these three factors. Within each of these three aspects of the 'triangle', Sternberg argues that disgust, anger/fear, and contempt as a manifestation of devaluation constitute the feeling of hate as a whole. Hate, then, is felt when people feel disgusted, angry, fearful, and devaluated, which can be triggered by moral transgressions. Pretus et al. (2022) note the association between contempt and transgressions of hierarchy, transgressions of anger, and transgressions related to personal autonomy/rights. Disgust, on the other hand, is related to transgressions of purity. In the current research, we expect that the moral emotions of this triangulation will dictate the difference in hate feelings towards different transgressors.

Evilness

The conceptualization of evilness became popular in the 1990s, with publications of psychologists such as Alford, Baumeister, and Zimbardo paving the way for modern research in this field (Quiles et al., 2010). Much like hate, evilness has been defined in multiple forms. In the context of this research, evil is best defined as a label used to characterize an individual's behavior (Burris, 2022). Numerous behaviors can be classified as 'evil', ranging on a spectrum from extremely aggressive to small, everyday harms (Quiles et al., 2010). For

evil to be associated with a specific behavior, research by Quiles et al. (2010) has found that specific personality dimensions must be recognized by the layperson – in particular, those that are consistent with the 'evil' and negativity in current news stories. More specifically, they found that lack of compassion, willingness to make suffer, intention and severe harm constituted over half of the variance in individual responses. This research also revealed that laypeople's perception of evil is very much influenced by real-life situations in which they either experience or read about. We would then expect that in this current research, evil will be more attributed to certain transgressors over others; ones they are perhaps more familiar with.

Can people be born evil? Zimbardo, in his infamous prison experiment, attempted to demonstrate that this is not the case: believing that the situation is what causes people to commit acts of evilness and not individual predispositions (Zimbardo, 2004). In 1971, Zimbardo conducted the Stanford Prison Experiment - where healthy participants with no history of antisocial behavior were assigned the role of guard or prisoner. The experiment, unfortunately, had to be terminated after 6 days due to the extreme pain and suffering the guards put on the prisoners. Although its empirical validity is questionable (Le Texier, 2019), the results of this experiment may provide evidence for participants attributing different levels of evilness towards different transgressors, depending on how circumstantial the transgression is. In other words, one may attribute more or less evil if the transgression is less attached to the person's character and more to the context.

A dispositional perspective has alternatively attempted to explain how we characterize evil in a person: that it is not the situation that has manifested evil, but rather the person's character (Merrick, 2019). Baumeister (2012) posits that 'evildoers' can be stereotyped, and that they all hold certain core characteristics –which he has labeled as "the myth of pure evil". Baumeister reports 6 components to this stereotype: (1) evil as intentionally inflicting

harm, (2) as representing the antithesis of order, peace, and stability, (3) driven by the wish to inflict harm solely for pleasure, (4) an innocent and good victim, (5) evil as unlike ourselves and (6) has always existed. Therefore, for a person to be evil, they must be 'born' with it, according to Baumeister. It is possible to match these components as characteristics of the moral transgressions found in the current study, to varying degrees. Particularly, in the way one might interpret a transgressor as intentionally inflicting harm (representative of stealing and harming), as the antithesis of order, peace, and stability (representative of injustice), and as driven by the wish to inflict harm for pleasure (representative of sexual harassment). We would hence expect different evilness attributions to be triggered based on the extent to which the 'evildoer' is perceived against these dispositional characteristics. This perception may also lead to the evaluation of the transgressor's character affecting the individual's perceived hate feelings.

Evilness Attribution and Feeling Hate

Despite the opposing situational and dispositional perspectives of evilness, Merrick (2019) states that they agree on three dimensions to characterize evil, these being intentionality, responsibility, and immorality. In other words, evil is characterized when: (1) the person has done something on purpose, (2) the person has made an active choice in performing the behavior, and (3) the person understands that some foundation of morality has been violated (Merrick, 2019). This aligns with the definition and characterization of hate feelings – as hate is felt with intent (usually concerning harming) and the target has violated a moral belief. Once an individual feels as though someone has committed a moral violation, they are more likely to feel hate rather than dislike for the person, and if this hate cannot be justified, the target of the hate will be perceived as evil (Burris, 2022).

Evilness can also be connected to interpersonal hate; hate one might feel towards members of their outgroup. Merrick (2019) found that a subject was perceived as more evil if they held group membership in a group that was hated by the participant, compared to if the participant hated someone with no group membership. He also found that a justification of their hate was often paired with dissonance reduction – relying on character assumptions about the subject, most likely motivated by the subject's group membership, such as evilness. Furthermore, assuming that the perpetrator is evil decreases how reluctant an individual might be in admitting their hate feelings towards them (Merrick, 2019). Findings by Halperin (2008) demonstrate this: most participants stated that if they wanted something bad to happen to members of a targeted group (a feeling associated with hate), then they were more likely to perceive these same members as evil. Hence, we would expect in the current research that if a transgressor is perceived as evil, then the participant will be less likely to conceal their hate and rate their hate feelings higher. We would also expect that interpersonal hate might mean that evilness is attributed to certain transgressors over others, which would also result in higher hate feelings.

Current Research

The purpose of this research is to investigate if people experience more hate towards certain transgressors depending on how evil they regard them. We also aim to look at whether or not there are differences in evilness attributions across different moral transgressions. As aforementioned, I will be exploring the following research question: "What is the role of the attributions of 'evilness' on the hate feelings people experience towards different moral transgressors?". To answer this question, the following three hypotheses have been formulated:

H1: There are differences in hate feelings towards different transgressors.

H2: Evilness positively predicts hate; the more evilness attributed, the higher the hate feelings will be.

H3: There is an interaction between the transgression condition and evilness – the more evilness that is attributed to specific transgressors, the higher hate feelings towards them.

Additionally, a supplementary hypothesis is proposed to further explore the hypothesized interaction between evilness and transgression condition. This is as follows:

H4: There are differences in evilness attributions towards different transgressors.

Method

Participants

A random sample of healthy adults (N = 269) was recruited from the United States through the online research platform Prolific. The pilot data (N = 31) and participants who either failed both attention check questions (N = 4) or submitted an incomplete survey (N = 14) were excluded from further analyses. After exclusion, a total sample of N = 220 remained, where 48.6% were male, 48.2% were female, and 3.2% identified as "other". Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 77 ($M = 42$, $SD = 14.5$). The majority of our sample was white (57.3%) and had obtained an undergraduate degree (39.5%). An *a priori* power analysis indicates that the sample size is suitable to detect small to medium effect sizes.

Instruments

The survey completed by the participants was designed using Qualtrics and was distributed on Prolific. A pilot study was conducted before data collection on a small convenience sample via Qualtrics, to check the functionality of the survey, gather general feedback, and adjust the instruments as needed. Based on this feedback, minor changes were made to the vignettes and the questions. The responses from the pilot study were not included in the main study, and these participants were not paid.

Vignettes

The survey's manipulation consisted of four vignettes, in which the transgression was described in approximately 6-8 sentences. The vignettes were inspired by true news headlines, consisting of one of the following four moral transgressions being acted upon by a transgressor: stealing, harming, sexual harassment, and injustice. Each of the moral transgressions was depicted as the following scenarios: stealing in the form of pickpocketing, harming in the form of punching someone following a conflict, sexual harassment in the form of inappropriate behavior in the workplace, and injustice in the form of corruption. All transgressors in the vignettes were male, due to these kinds of transgressors typically being male. See the complete vignettes in Appendix A.

Measures

After each vignette, our dependent measures followed in a randomized order, in which participants were exposed to each measure. We measured evilness with the item "Do you think the [insert transgressor] in the situation you just read was 'born evil' and that's the way he is?". The data is part of a larger project, where other variables measured but are irrelevant to the research question include severity and changeableness. Measures used in this paper were rated on a 7-point Likert scale: from *1 ("extremely unlikely")* to *7 ("extremely likely")*.

Hate. Hate was measured in this study using an adaptation of the Passionate Hate Scale, originally developed by Zeki and Romaya (2008). It is based on the Triangular theory of hate (Sternberg, 2004). Accordingly, this measure involves three subscales: contempt, anger, and disgust. Each subscale comprises four items (12 items in total, see Appendix B), operationalized as statements that reflect the participant's attitude toward the transgressor. Examples of statements are 'I really despise this person' (contempt), 'I cannot control my anger towards this person' (anger), and 'This person is really disgusting' (disgust). Answers are rated

on a Likert scale from *1=strongly disagree* to *7=strongly agree*. The scale yields a hate score, ranging from 0 to 72; certain items were reverse-coded as needed. Attention checks were conducted when deemed fit, where the participant had to select a certain number. Cronbach's alpha for the Passionate Hate Scale was .93, showing good reliability.

Procedure

Ethical approval for this cross-sectional study was obtained from the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences at the University of Groningen prior to data collection.

The data collection of the main study took place on the 3rd of April 2024 via Prolific. Before completing the online questionnaire, participants read a short overview of the general nature of the study and the survey, including instructions. Giving informed consent was needed to confirm anonymous participation and proceed with the survey. Participants were exposed to four within-subjects conditions in random order, through the use of vignettes. After being exposed to each condition, the instruments were presented for the participant to answer about the specific vignette. Both the vignettes and the follow-up questions were presented in a counterbalanced order, to control for carryover and sequential effects. At the end of the study, the respondents provided sociodemographic information. Finally, they read a debriefing form describing the aim and the content of the study further and received the contact details of the researcher. The survey took on average 14.23 minutes to complete, and each person was paid 2.30 USD per 15 minutes for their participation.

Analytical Strategy

All statistical analyses were conducted using jamovi (Version 2.3.28). Once data collection was finished, necessary items were reverse-coded to compute the total scores for the hate scale. To test the three primary hypotheses, a one-way ANCOVA was conducted, entering transgression condition as a fixed factor, evilness as the covariate, and hate as the dependent

variable. To test our final supplementary hypothesis (H4), a one-way ANOVA was conducted, with evilness as the dependent variable and the transgression condition as the independent variable.

Results

A QQ plot revealed that the model assumption of Normality is met, see Appendix C. Outliers were not removed from data analysis, see Appendix D for boxplots visualizing the variable distributions by condition with outliers. Descriptive statistics by condition for hate and evil scores are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations for Hate and Evilness Scores for Each Transgression

|	Transg_condition	Hate	Evilness
M	Stealing	4.81	2.74
	Harming	4.96	2.89
	Harassing	5.62	3.62
	Injustice	5.31	3.39
SD	Stealing	1.04	1.74
	Harming	0.862	1.71
	Harassing	0.855	2.00
	Injustice	0.879	2.00

Note. M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation

The ANCOVA analysis demonstrated a significant main effect of hate feelings by transgression type , $F(3, 872) = 14.03, p < .001, \eta^2 p = .046$. After conducting post-hoc comparisons using Tukey's correction, it was found that the most significant difference between mean scores for hate feelings was between stealing (M = 4.89, SE = .0607) and harassing (M = 5.57, SE = .0606), with harassing yielding higher scores ($M_{diff} = -0.688, t = -8.02, p < .001$). Additional comparisons revealed that compared to the stealing and harming (M = 5.01, SE = .0598) transgressors, the injustice transgressor (M =

5.29, SE $=$ .0594) produced higher hate scores ($M_{diff} = -0.404, t = -4.75, p <$ .001; $M_{diff} = -0.283, t = -3.36, p = .004$), but that if comparing injustice to harassing, then alternatively the harassing transgressor had a higher score ($M_{diff} = 0.284, t = 3.35, p = .005$). Harassing also scored higher for hate compared to the harming condition ($M_{diff} = -0.568, t = -6.67, p < .001$). The difference in mean scores between stealing and harming transgressors was not deemed statistically significant ($M_{diff} = -0.120, t = -1.41, p = 0.491$). These results are depicted in Figure 1, suggesting that hate feelings differ based on transgression condition which is in line with H1. ANCOVA analysis reported that there is a significant main effect of evilness on hate feelings, $F(1,872) = 76.78, p < .001, \eta^2 p = .081$, providing support for H2. For this specific effect, the parameter estimate was $\beta = 0.277, p, .001$. A significant interaction effect was not found between the transgression condition and the level of evilness attribution on the hate outcome, $F(3,872) = 1.86, p = 0.135, \eta^2 p = .006$. This suggests that evilness and transgression condition combined do not explain hate feelings, contradictory with H3. Figure 2 illustrates the results which disconfirm our third hypothesis.

Figure 1.

Estimated Marginal Means Plot for the Hate Scores Per Transgression Condition

*Note.* $* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001$

Figure 2.

Evilness on Hate by Transgression Condition

Note. There is no interaction between evilness and transgression condition.

A one-way ANOVA analysis identified a significant effect of transgression condition on evilness, $F(3,485) = 10.7, p < .001$. Post-hoc comparisons with Tukey's correction revealed that mean scores for evilness are highest for harassing ($M = 3.62, \ SD = 2.00$) , more specifically when compared to stealing ($M = 2.74, \ SD = 1.74; M_{diff} = -0.882$) and harming ($M = 2.89, SD = 1.71; \ M_{diff} = -0.736$). Additionally, mean scores for injustice ($M = 3.39, SD = 2.00$) are significantly higher than the hate scores for stealing ($M_{diff} = -0.645$) and harming ($M_{DIFF} = -0.500$). The means of stealing and harming ($M_{DIFF} = -0.145, p = 0.846$) and harassing and injustice ($M_{DIFF} = 0.236, p = 0.546$) did not significantly differ. Results are summarized in Figure 3.

Figure 3.

Plot Demonstrating the Means of Evilness Attribution per Transgression Condition

Note. $*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001$

Discussion

The goals of this paper were to investigate how evilness attributions interact with hate feelings towards different transgressors. Moreover, we aimed to see if perceiving a transgressor as 'born evil' would affect the hate feelings felt towards a transgressor and if the attribution of evil towards certain transgressors would explain higher hate feelings. We also examined differences in evilness attributions across transgressors to understand the interaction between transgression condition and evilness. Results show that there is an effect

of transgression type on hate, with the highest amount of hate across all conditions attributed to the harassing transgressor. Furthermore, hate scores were also higher for the injustice transgressor compared to the stealing and harming transgressors – but when looking at the stealing and harming transgressors independently, no significant difference was present between the two. We also found that there was an effect of evilness on hate. However, once we considered the interaction between evilness and transgression condition, results demonstrated that evilness attribution towards specific transgressors does not explain the hate feelings felt. Despite the lack of interaction present in explaining hate feelings, results did however indicate that differences in evilness attribution exist across transgression conditions.

Implications

The results in support of the first hypothesis coincide with existing literature on morality and hate, primarily by Pretus et al. (2023): hate feelings stem from an appraisal of whether core moral beliefs are violated. In particular, our results reveal that there is a variation in hate feelings and violated moral beliefs, with stealing having the lowest average hate score and sexual harassment having the highest. Variation in these hate scores in relation to morality may best be explained through moral relativism. Moral relativism suggests that situational factors can determine how morally right or wrong behavior is (Sulsky et al., 2015) – in other words, whether or not a transgressor's behavior is judged as violating one's morals becomes relative to the nature of the transgression. Applying this concept to our results, it can then be likely that differences in hate scores, if we assume that it is connected to the level of recognized moral violation, are due to either participants judging the transgressor: (a) relative to the other transgressors they have already been exposed to or (b) relative to how exaggerated the consequences towards the victim were perceived to be. This latter explanation is said to be directly relevant to whether or not a moral issue is present within the self (Sulsky et al., 2015). This implies, for instance, that a participant may have appraised the

stealing transgressor as less morally violating due to the context of the vignettes, and consequently had less hate for him because he was either not violating the participant's moral beliefs as much as other transgressors (unless they received the stealing condition first) or the consequences of the transgressor's actions were perceived as not severe in that particular situation.

Our findings for the second hypothesis support existing theories for the relationship between evil and hate – that feeling hate towards someone is connected to their perception of this person as evil. We can connect our findings firstly with Merrick's (2019) dimensions of evil (intentionality, responsibility, and immorality) and Burris' (2022) characterization of hate feelings. A main effect of evilness on hate hence confirms that individuals do indeed characterize evilness and hate in similar ways and are likely to attribute both evilness and hate combined to a transgressor. Our results are also linked to the moral foundations theory (MFT), which asserts that there exist multiple innate psychological foundations that govern our moral judgments and emotions (Graham et al., 2018). Violations of these foundations trigger moral emotions such as anger and disgust (Graham et al., 2013) – emotions that comprise the current study's operationalization of hate. Therefore, when a foundation is violated within an individual because of someone's actions, then hate feelings should ensue. MFT can explain our findings because of the way that transgressions perceived as evil are seen as a violation of the care/harm foundation (Graham et al., 2012); if the transgressor is seen as 'born evil', then hate feelings will be triggered. As the degree of evilness attribution in a transgressor increases, so does the amount of hate feelings, similar to how stronger moral violations from MFT elicit stronger moral emotions.

Our findings which do not demonstrate an interaction between transgression condition and evilness on hate suggest that the type of moral transgression and how much evil a transgressor is attributed operate independently of each other to explain hate feelings. This is

not in line with current literature, as research on evilness in terms of interpersonal hate, in particular, suggests that an individual's perception of a transgressor's evilness would depend on the type of moral transgression and the character assumptions that underlie a particular individual (Merrick, 2019). The results of the current study therefore imply that the independent effects of evilness and transgression condition on hate are consistent across many scenarios. Situational factors associated with the transgressor, such as is theorized in the situational perspective of evil (Zimbardo, 2004), do not play a role in attributing evilness nor in creating hate feelings as a response to perceived evilness.

Practical implications for these results include designing targeted interventions for mitigating the effects of evilness attribution and type of transgression on hate separately. This would entail empathy training, which would aim to build empathy and alter perceptions of evilness towards individuals or groups, and promotion of contextual understanding which can incite transgressor behavior. Interventions within the justice system should focus on how we perceive an offender because of their circumstances and independently attribute evilness to them – to provide an understanding of how these factors may contribute to their sentencing.

Strengths, Limitations, Further Directions

The strengths of this research and its findings are many. The large sample size, made possible with the use of an online survey to gather results, means that the dataset is externally valid. Another strength was the use of a pilot study, in which the vignettes and the measures were revised as needed for clarity. This most likely also contributed to the validity and reliability of the study. Finally, a last strength of important mention was the within-subjects experimental design, which controlled for individual differences across conditions that could have confounded the results.

Limitations for this research, on the other hand, are mostly concerned with the fact that the study was done through self-reporting. This could have led to underreporting of how much hate they felt or evilness they attributed to a transgressor, socially desirable responses, and inconsistencies between different items of the same measure. Another important limitation is that the survey was done on an American website, suggesting that the results could be quite US-centric. This would signify that the results might not have cross-cultural validity and that cultural differences in hate and evilness are not accurately represented nor understood in the context of our results. Finally, a last limitation is in our measures. Evilness measured as only one item does not allow for the complexity of evil to be displayed in our results – and by narrowing the operationalization of evilness as purely 'something one is born with', any other interpretation of the concept is not recognized. This may pressure participants to report their attribution of the transgressor as less evil, even though they may feel the evilness to not be born into and instead a consequence of the transgressor's actions.

To better understand the role attributing evilness has towards attributing hate feelings to transgressors and how morality contributes to hate, further directions for research include studying the role of moral identity in the relationship between variables. This could be done by looking at moral beliefs – how strong they are to participants, how they would order them based on importance, and if they predict stronger hate feelings and/or evilness attribution.

Conclusion

Feeling hate towards an individual is influenced by many factors, with a confirmed link between hate and evil. Taken together, these results indicate that the attribution of evilness and the nature of moral transgression are important variables in predicting hate feelings but are separate pathways. This research provides insight into the significance of

evilness attribution for the experience of hate feelings, although the full extent of its

contribution to hate needs to be investigated in more depth.

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Appendix A

Complete Vignettes Given to the Participant

Vignette 1: Stealing

"A man has been pickpocketing in the metro without being caught. He usually stands by the door during rush hours, waiting until people are distracted to slide his hand into their pockets and steal their small but valuable items such as wallets and mobile phones. One day, the man sees a great opportunity. A young woman is distracted while having a phone conversation and has her backpack open with her laptop exposed. The man waits until the next stop and slowly takes her laptop from her backpack, leaving the metro without her noticing."

Vignette 2: Harming

"Driver A is in a busy parking lot looking for a spot. Someone is just leaving, so a place is about to be available. However, another car (Driver B) was waiting across looking for the same spot for even longer, so Driver B rightfully proceeds to park his car. Driver A gets really angry, steps out of his car, and confronts Driver B, who is also stepping out. Driver B is willing to negotiate, so he starts to explain the situation in a calm and reasonable way. But without waiting, or saying a word, Driver A punches Driver B in the face and leaves."

Vignette 3: Sexual Harassment

"The manager of a small company has been inappropriately approaching his female employees. One day, he asks one of them to stay after work to help him with a project. While working on the tasks, he makes inappropriate comments about her appearance and touches her thigh. After she refuses, he insists and tries to kiss her. She resists again and claims to be

feeling uncomfortable and that she wants to leave. He replies that if she leaves now, she better not come the next day because she will lose her job."

Vignette 4: Injustice

"A politician was in charge of managing the taxpayers' money for developing community projects and building a public school in a deprived area. Because of some administrative and legal gaps, he sees the opportunity to delay the projects indefinitely and create a parallel account for keeping the money for himself and some of his associates. Later, the case is discovered, and he is convicted of embezzlement. However, using the same funds, he bribes the jury in charge of his case, and is declared innocent, after which he leaves the country."

Appendix B

Passionate Hate Scale (PHS)

"Please think about the man [insert transgression here] and indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree."

	1. Strongly Diasgree	2. Disagree	3. Somewhat disagree	4. Neither Agree nor Disagree	5. Somewhat Agree	6. Agree	7. Strongly Agree
I cannot control my anger towards this person	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
This person is scum.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I do not want this person anywhere near me.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I have kind thoughts for this person.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I would like to do something to harm this person.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I really despise this person.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The world would be a better place without this person.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
This is a very nice person.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I have aggressive thoughts about this person.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
This person does not deserve any consideration.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
This person is really disgusting	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I would like to interact with this person.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

**Appendix C**

Figure 3.

QQ Plot to Test Normality

Appendix D

**Boxplots of Variable Distribution**

Figure 1.

Boxplot Visualizing the Mean Values of Hate per Transgression Condition

Figure 2.

Boxplot Visualizing the Mean Values of Evilness per Transgression Condition

Appendix E

Descriptives

Table 1.

Frequencies of Moral Identity in Participants

Moral_Identity	Counts	% of Total	Cumulative %
2	4	0.5 %	0.5 %
3	4	0.5 %	0.9 %
4	36	4.1 %	5.0 %
5	152	17.3 %	22.3 %
6	272	30.9 %	53.2 %
7. Very important	412	46.8 %	100.0 %

Table 2.

Frequencies of Ethnicity in Participants

Ethnicity	Counts	% of Total	Cumulative %
Asian	120	13.6 %	13.6 %
Black or African American	144	16.4 %	30.0 %
Hispanic or Latino	76	8.6 %	38.6 %
White	504	57.3 %	95.9 %
Multiracial or Biracial	20	2.3 %	98.2 %
Other	8	0.9 %	99.1 %
Middle Eastern	8	0.9 %	100.0 %