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Sliding Across the Social Ladder: A Cross-Country Analysis into Social Conflict Perceptions and Subjective Social Class Trajectories.

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Abstract

This thesis investigated variation in five dimension of social conflict. Individuals were categorised into Subjective Social Class Trajectories: social climbers, social fallers, a stable group and a rest group. These types were related to the theory of conflict thinking. As perceptions of conflict vary between countries, the study examined the impact of the inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) on these conflict perceptions, and how the IHDI moderates the effect of the social class types. Cross-sectional analysis using linear mixed-effects multilevel models was conducted using 2019 data from 27 countries in the International Social Science Panel (n = 44,975). The typologies were present in all countries. Analysis results showed partial support for the hypotheses. IHDI predicted lower levels of conflict dimensions. Socially mobile individuals had lower perceptions of conflict than the stable group in countries with a lower IHDI, however they had higher perceptions in countries with a higher IHDI.

Statement on AI use

To assist with the writing process, I used the DeepL Write function (2025) to check my work. DeepL is a translation and text-writing tool. This was used to adjust choice of words, grammar, and sentence structure in my text.

No generative AI was used during the writing of this thesis.

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An increase in perceptions of social conflict has been observed across countries (Van Drunen et al., 2021, pp. 611–614). Over the past few decades, the world has experienced economic crises, rising inequality, significant immigration and ageing populations (Van Drunen et al., 2021, p. 596). These are turbulent times, or times of high social commotion. However, most research related to notions of social conflict or high social commotion has focused on issues such as inequality (Delhey & Drogalov, 2014), populism (Abts & Baute, 2022), and threats to the middle class (Pressman, 2007, 2010). This research has not directly addressed the rise in perceptions of social conflict.

Hertel and Schöneck (2022) conducted one of the few studies that has sought to systematically investigate variation in perceptions of social conflict in a multi-level, cross-country study. They found a link between perceptions of social conflict and perceptions of inequality. They argued that people's beliefs about how wealth is distributed in their country could explain variations in perceptions of social conflict (Hertel & Schöneck, 2022, pp. 234–236). Aggregating these stratification beliefs revealed that countries where people believed they lived in a more equal society had lower levels of conflict perception (Hertel & Schöneck, 2022, pp. 238–241).

However, their study has two limitations. It lumps together different types of perceived conflict, and it conceptualises perceived class membership as a static phenomenon. This was done by only focusing on where in the social someone positions themselves here and now, but neglecting where they believe they will be in the future and where they were in the past.

The present thesis addresses these limitations, first by disentangling five different dimensions of conflict perception. These are: conflict between the rich and the poor, the working and the middle classes, management and workers, immigrants and non-immigrants, and old and young people. Secondly, people will be categorised into what I call *Subjective Social Class Trajectories.* This refers to an assessment of how individuals envision their social class position at three points in time: where they were when they grew up, where they are now, and where they believe they will be in ten years' time. Four types of class trajectories will be assessed: First are the Social Climbers, which are

the individuals that expect to see growth in socioeconomic status throughout their life. Second are the Social Fallers, people who expect that their socioeconomic status will go down throughout their life. Third, a Stable group, who expect their socioeconomic status to remain consistent throughout their life. The last is a fluctuating, or "other" group for individuals that do not fit the described patterns. I tie these types to the theory of conflict thinking (Spruyt et al., 2018) by arguing how some individuals are more or less likely to engage in this type of thinking and how this leads to variations in perceptions of social conflict. As conflict perceptions are tied to the social and institutional structure of a society, the analysis will also investigate how difference in country wealth and inequality impact conflict perceptions, and how this impacts the prevalence on conflict thinking.

The aim of this study is to answer the following research questions:

1. Descriptive: Describe and assess the prevalence of the Subjective Social Class Trajectories.
2. Explanatory: Can variation in the perception of social conflict be explained by an individual's Subjective Social Class Trajectory?

The Social Inequality V Panel from 2019 will be analysed, which is part of the International Social Science Survey Panel (ISSP Research Group, 2022). This is the most recent version of the panel analysed by Hertel and Schöneck (2022) in their paper. The data will be analysed using a mixed-effects multilevel linear models.

Theory

Perceptions of social conflict

Social conflict can arise when people, parties, communities or organisations are in competition with each other (Oberschall, 1978, p. 292). These groups may have different views on the severity or existence of the conflict. Events can be interpreted very differently across demographic or political lines (Robison et al., 1995, p.414). To account for the subjective nature of perceptions of conflict, social conflict can be viewed as a frame for understanding societal relations (Van Drunen et al., 2021, p.596). The frame through which people look at the world is not fixed, as people are influenced by their experience and their surroundings (Wood, 2000). For conflict in particular, people are influenced by their perception of challenges such as economic crises and migration (Marsella, 2005, p.658). The social surroundings of an individual, as well as the related institutional structures react to such challenges (Marsella, 2005, pp. 657-659). Individuals can be influenced by the opinions of their social group, as well as by these institutional reactions. Political actors are an example of this. Political leaders encourage individuals to understand societal relations within a particular frame. Right-wing parties have been shown to set the agenda and provoke discontent regarding immigration (Van Rooduijn et al., 2016, p.36; Schmidt-Catran, 2023, p.94). In the United States, institutional forces joined together to create political conflict and public upheaval in order to justify the defunding of the welfare state (Marsella, 2005, p.665).

The influence of social and political institutions means that perceptions of conflict vary from country to country (Van Drunen et al., 2021, p. 614). Actual and perceived levels of wealth and inequality both play a role here (Hertel & Schöneck, 2022, p. 240).

` To better understand variations in conflict perception, the conditions under which people are more susceptible to interpreting social interactions as conflict must be examined.

Social Conflict Dimensions

In this thesis, I investigate five dimensions of social conflict. This section describes how these dimensions can manifest.

Conflict between the rich and poor

Conflict between the rich and poor is generally not observed directly. It can be understood as: "…the objective, albeit remote and impersonal, reality of social groups' opposed interest and the conflict they generate…" (Kelley & Evans, 1995, p.160). The rich and poor being in conflict has been a popular media staple for a while. Society's problems are explained by the elites working against ordinary people (Van Drunen et al., 2021, p.599). When this gap between the rich and poor grows too large, individuals might start demanding changes to the social system (Simon 2016, p.6).

Conflict between upper and lower classes

The conflict between the upper and lower classes is not characterised by the same degree of difference in power and wealth as that between the rich and poor. Competition can be more direct here, as people from the lower and middle classes often live in the same neighbourhoods. It arises when the same individuals contest jobs or housing. One way in which competition can be further instigated is when individuals seek to improve their financial situation by becoming increasingly competitive at work (Gough, 1992, pp. 265–266).

Conflict between management and workers

Conflict between management and workers is partially driven by the hierarchical structure that a lot of companies have. Managers and workers can get into arguments about work practice or results. Conversely, a more indirect manifestation of this conflict happens when workers become unhappy about the functioning of the organisation. Work conflict has a negative impact on workers' well-being (De Dreu et al., 2004, p. 14). With management and workers not perceiving the same level of conflict within organisations, suggesting that workers are more attentive or sensitive to conflict than management (Livingstone et al., 2021).

Conflict between immigrants and host population

Contemporary political discourse has been deeply engulfed in discussion and debate around immigration, which is often tied together with other issues such as euroscepticism, nationalism and the rise of right-wing populism. Much research has been conducted into the relationship between these issues (Stockemer et al., 2018; Shehaj et al., 2021). Individuals' perceive there to be competition between immigrants and non-immigrants. For example, immigrants may be perceived as competing for cultural space and resources (MacLaren & Johnson, 2007, pp. 726–727).

Conflict between older and younger generations

Lastly, is the idea of generational conflict, or conflict between the young and the old. A larger share of the population is surpassing the pension age across the world, prompting national discussions about social welfare, pensions, and the healthcare system.[1] Extensive work is being done to try to tackle these issues.[2] These discussion can breed conflict perceptions between the young and the old, where blame or competition might be attributed to the perceived lack of proper support by that state.

Inequality and evidence for conflict variation

Only sparse research has been conducted assessing differences in conflict perceptions. The relationship between social conflict and inequality can offer some insight. A traditional theory of conflict holds that most conflict can be traced back to inequality (Simon, 2016, p.2). Perception of inequality influence conflict perceptions (Hertel & Schöneck (2022, pp.233-234). In the described dimensions, inequality is present in the sense that one side has social and financial capital that the other does not. This has a clear impact in the sensitivity to conflict. An example of this is that managers perceive there to be less conflict than their employees (Livingstone et al., 2021). The managerial position is fundamentally more comfortable, because they have influence on the position

[1] Some scepticism in the literature exists on the validity of this generational conflict as its own dimension, with some authors arguing generational conflict is rooted in unequal material conditions across generations (Arber & Attias-Donfut, 2000, pp.18-19).
[2] See: Marier (2021)

of the worker in the company. Having more control, be it at work, or in your private life, makes the upper class less sensitive to conflict when it does happen.

Research on conflict between immigrants and non-immigrants has mixed evidence. In Europe, wealthier and more highly educated individuals generally have more positive opinions of immigrant integration and the European Union (Abts & Baute, 2021, pp. 48–49; Schmidt-Catran, 2023, p. 94). More positive opinions of a group lead to lower perceptions of social conflict (Van Drunen et al., 2021, p. 612). However, contrary findings showed that in wealthier countries people were more concerned with immigration. Higher-educated people believed immigration would lead to more social conflict (Dennison & Geddes, 2021, pp. 546, 550). In the United Kingdom, a significant proportion of the population believes that immigrants threaten their culture and place a strain on national resources. (McLaren & Johnson, 2007, pp. 718, 726–727).

This heterogeneity of results shows that more clarity is needed.

Subjective Social Class Trajectories and Perceived Social Conflict: A Conflict Thinking Approach

As inequalities are an important factor in perceptions of social conflict, social class is a good starting to point to investigate the issue. Social class represents a relative position within a society. Being a member of a specific class can result in different social and material realities in different countries. People are aware of where they stand on the social ladder and position themselves accordingly (Kraus et al., 2017, p. 427).

One’s social class affects one's experience of the world. Higher levels of wealth are associated with greater life satisfaction (Cheung & Lucas, 2015, p. 126), and neighborhoods are often segregated according to the social class of their residents (Garbasevschi et al., 2023, pp. 7–8; Tammaru et al., 2019, p. 457). The effects of social class are long-lasting, lower-class individuals often struggle to succeed at university or work, even if they are qualified (Manstead, 2018, p. 283). Members of the upper class are often able to organise their lives in ways that allow them to avoid certain types of conflictual behaviour.

However, when individuals assess their place in society, they do not just consider their current position on the social ladder. An individual's formative years inform the standard of living they will come to expect (Manstead, 2018, p.273). Expectations of the future also plays a role. When investigating the link between social class and social conflict, social class dynamics should also be taken into account.

One example of this is how university students perceive their social class. Many work in low-paid jobs and accrue significant student debt. Nevertheless, most would not describe themselves as poor or as belonging to the lower class. They expect to complete their education and go on to hold well-paid jobs. Despite their current relatively low level of wealth and social power, they do not feel burdened by this because they perceive a bright future. Conversely, an individual who currently enjoys a high standard of living but knows they will likely lose their job in the next few years will not be able to enjoy it fully, as their status is only temporary.

The idea that class expectations play an important role is the basis for the creation of Subjective Social Class Trajectory types. These types can be linked to Spruyt et al.'s (2018) theory of conflict thinking. According to this theory, people in vulnerable situations are more likely to exhibit populist and prejudiced views (Spruyt et al., 2018, p. 18). The theory argues that this is because people in precarious situations get high levels of insecurity and anxiety about their situation. In order to cope with this unpleasant mental state, individuals engage in conflict thinking. This means reinterpreting events in the world as a conflict between opposing groups. As Spruyt et al. put it: "Indeed, when 'your' problems are represented as part of 'our' problems, 'your' responsibility in the vulnerability experienced decreases automatically. It is this aspect that encourages those feeling vulnerable to rely on us-them distinctions and group identification…" (2018, p.19). Engaging in conflict thinking makes dealing with the insecure position more tolerable for the individual.[3]

[3] See also research on status insecurity and anxiety (Delhey & Dragolov, 2014; Delhey et al., 2017; Maren et al., 2025).

Social fallers

Social fallers are people who perceive that their social class has declined from their youth to the present day and will continue to do so in the future.

The social standing and wealth enjoyed during one's childhood becomes a reference point for the rest of one's life (Manstead, 2018, p. 273). Habits are formed and expectations around one's standard of living are created. It is well established that people dislike loss more than they like gain (Kahneman et al., 1991). If an individual perceives that further losses are possible in the future, the motive of loss avoidance is triggered. This, in turn, creates status anxiety and feelings of insecurity (Delhey & Dragolov, 2014, pp. 158–159). Those who experience a decline in their social status see themselves as being in a highly vulnerable situation, which causes them to engage in conflict thinking to cope with it (Spruyt et al., 2018). Reframing anxieties as conflict makes it easier to deal with an unpleasant situation as it provides a simple explanation for it. Conflict thinking is something that happens daily in one's social surroundings or on the news. Due to increased insecurity about their situation, individuals become much more sensitive to this type of framing and are more likely to engage in this type of thinking themselves. When interactions on the street, at work or with neighbours are reframed as conflict in this way, individuals will start to perceive much more conflict. An unpleasant interaction at work, for example, becomes emblematic of a divide between the rich and the poor. A news item about an immigrant committing a crime becomes proof that the native population is in conflict with the immigrant population. Figure 1 illustrates this argumentation, how perceived changes in social class can lead to a higher levels of conflict perception.

H1**:** Social fallers perceive higher levels of conflict than social climbers and the rest.



Figure 1: Theoretical framework

Social climbers

Social climbers are people who perceive their social class as moving upwards throughout their life.

They perceive themselves as socially mobile. Perceptions of social mobility are influenced by one's current social and financial position in society (Kraus et al., 2012, p. 550), as well as by the belief that social mobility is possible within the system (Kraus & Tan, 2015, pp. 104–105). Those aspiring to be higher on the social ladder are generally more focused on their personal goals and issues (Kraus et al., 2012, p. 549). These goals can be social or professional, meaning they are less focused on problems in their life, such as issues at work or political issues where they live. Individuals also internalise future gains, in anticipation of a pay rise, people will become much less stressed about money, and more confident about their current situation (Knight & Gunatilaka, 2012, p. 75). While social fallers are concerned about future loss, social climbers internalise future gains. This means that, even when they encounter loss or hardship in their daily lives, loss avoidance is less likely to be triggered (see figure 1). This is because the losses they experience in life are offset by the expected future gains, as well as the perceived gains they have already had since their upbringing. As the loss-avoidance frame is not triggered, fewer feelings of insecurity or anxiety arise, meaning that people are less susceptible to conflict thinking when it occurs in their surroundings.

This argument could explain why previous research found that belief in meritocracy was associated with lower perceptions of economic conflict (Van Noord et al., 2025, p. 572).

H2**:** Social climbers perceive lower levels of conflict than social fallers, climbers and the rest.

Socially stable individuals

Those who perceive stability in their social class have no reason to feel anxious or optimistic beyond their current socioeconomic status. While they may face challenges due to limited material resources if they are less well-off, these difficulties are not exacerbated by fears of further decline or a sense of having fallen from a better position in the past. Consequently, they are less likely to view their situation in an overly negative or positive light.

Other group

The individuals who do not fit the previously discussed groups will have a great variety in patterns and possible psychological mechanisms of their movement on the social ladder. If people follow more complicated patterns in their perception of their social class, there will be great heterogeneity in the mechanisms, not much can thus be concluded about this group.

National wealth and inequality as a protective buffer

Indicators such as the Human Development Index reflect a society's quality of life and wealth. Hertel and Schöneck's (2022, p. 240) study showed that wealthier countries had lower conflict perceptions. The organisation of societies impacts people's well-being, the strength of the welfare state, and the level of inequality (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hall & Gingerich, 2009; Epsing-Andersen, 1990).

Perceptions of economic conflict differ between rich and poor countries (Yamamura, 2016, pp. 60–61). Inequality has both social and economic impacts on individuals (Kraus et al., 2017, p. 423). As levels of wealth and inequality differ from nation to nation, the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) can help explain variations in perceptions of conflict. The IHDI is a score that adjusts national wealth according to the level of inequality. This is useful because while wealthier

countries generally have better outcomes on many important metrics, the level of inequality also determines the extent to which the lower classes can benefit from this wealth. Wealthier countries have more resources available, leading to less competition over them. Lower inequality means that the lower classes receive a larger share, which has a similar impact.H3: Individuals in countries with higher levels of IHDI will have lower levels of conflict perceptions than individuals in countries with lower levels of IHDI.

Whether someone is a social faller or a social climber will depend on a country's wealth and level of inequality. For social fallers, a combination of low inequality and high national development acts as a protective buffer. Members of the lower social class are more likely to have access to good healthcare, education and housing. This provides a more stable environment. Figure 1 shows how the national context influences the strength of this loss avoidance. In this case, the expected loss of falling down the social ladder is less severe, reducing the extent to which loss avoidance is triggered and leading to a relatively lower perception of conflict in wealthier and more equal countries.

For social climbers, the potential benefits of moving up the social ladder are smaller. As the expected future gains are smaller, they do not compensate to the same extent for the losses experienced in their current lives. This means that social climbers will have relatively higher conflict perceptions in wealthier and more equal countries.

H4: In countries with a higher IHDI social fallers perceive relatively less conflict than in societies with lower IHDI.
H5: In countries with a higher IHDI social climbers perceive relatively more conflict than in societies with lower IHDI.

Figure 2 shows the conceptual model of this thesis.



Figure 2: The conceptual model with hypotheses

Methods

Data

Data is used from the ISSP (International Social Survey Programme) Social Inequality V 2019 module. The survey was taken in 34 countries. Five countries were dropped from the merged dataset the ISSP provided, either for late submittal or methodological issues. This leaves a dataset which includes 29 countries. The countries primarily consisted of the Anglosphere and European countries, with also countries from South America, (South)East-Asia, and the country of South Africa.

Data was collected between November 2018 and May 2022 by the official statistical organisations of the participating countries.[4] In some cases, data was collected alongside data for other studies. Sampling was conducted using probability, simple random and multistage probability methods, depending on the country. In most cases, the sample population was individuals over the age of 18.[5] Data was collected through self-administered online or paper questionnaires, as well as through in-person, telephone, or online interviews. Each country had between 966 and 4,250 respondents, with a total of 44,975 respondents across all countries. For full details, the data report can be consulted from ISSP Research Group (2022).

Variables

Dependent variables

There are five dependent variables, which equate to five dimensions of *Perceived Social Conflict*. The question asked was: "In all countries, there are differences or even conflicts between different social groups. In your opinion, in [COUNTRY] how much conflict is there between: poor people and rich people, the working class and the middle class, management and workers, young people and older people, people born in [COUNTRY] and people from other countries who have come to live in [COUNTRY]." The answer

[4] e.g. Switzerland's Federal Statistics Office

[5] Three countries had a different lower limit of 15, 16, and 21. Two countries had an upper limit of 74, and three countries had an upper limit of 79.

options were: (1) Very strong conflicts (2) Strong conflicts (3) Not very strong conflicts (4) There are no conflicts

For use in the analysis, the variable will also be mirrored so that *there are no conflicts* will be (0). The variable will be treated as a linear variable. This is because there is a clear zero-point, and this will prevent loss of information that would happen by making the variable binomial.

Level 1 independent variables

The main independent variable is *Subjective Social Class Trajectory*. The following three questions will be used, all use a (0) bottom – (10) top scale:

- In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Below is a scale which runs from top to bottom. Where would you put yourself now on this scale?
- And if you think about the family that you grew up in, where did they fit in then?
- And thinking ahead 10 years from now, where do you think you will be on a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 is the top and 1 the bottom?

Using the information from these questions, the following dummies will be coded based on the increase, decrease, or equality between the three timepoints:

- Social climbers: An increase from past to present and present to future.
- Social fallers: A decrease from past to present and present to future.
- Stable group: Equal at the three points.
- Fluctuating group: people who do not fit these patterns.

The stable group will serve as the reference group.

Level 2 independent variable

The inequality adjusted Human Development Index goes from 0 to 1. HDI is calculated by assessing the following three points: "—a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living." (UNDP, 2019,p.303). For the IHDI, this is calculated through

the same three points, but adjusting for inequalities on those dimensions (UNDP, 2019,p.311)

Covariates

The level 1 control variables will be the same as in the study by Hertel and Schöneck (2022). The control variables used are Age (measured in years). Socio-economic Status, with (1) Lower class (2) Working Class (3) Lower middle class (4) Middle class (5) Upper middle class (6) Upper Class. Gender (0) Male (1) Female.

Socio-economic status will be recoded to two dummies with 3 and 4 being coded as a dummy for middle class, and 5 and 6 being coded as a dummy for upper class. Lower class will function as the reference group.

As a reference for the Subjective Social Class Trajectory, self-assessed social class at the current time will also be added as a covariate.

Missing data

For missing data, the patterns of missingness will be investigated to assess if data is missing at random. Based on the amount of missing data, listwise deletion or imputation will be performed.

Due to Taiwan not being part of the United Nations no official Human Development Index data for this country exists. The value of Austria was imputed based on the very small difference of Austria's HDI vs Taiwan's subnational HDI score (Smits & Permanyer, 2019) and the small difference on the Gini coefficient, which is a measure of the levels of inequality in a country (World Bank, 2021)

Analysis

The study will be cross-sectional. Five multi-level mixed effect linear models will be estimated with individuals (level 1) within countries (level 2). The dependent variable,

Perceived Social Conflict is at level 1. The independent/control variables are at level 1 and level 2.

The multi-level regression will be performed using the programming language R (R Core Team, 2025). For each of the dependent variables, five models will be estimated. First, an empty model will be estimated to be able to assess the intra-class correlation (ICC). Second, a model adding the level 1 predictors as fixed effects will be estimated. Third, a model adding random effects for the Subjective Social Class Trajectory dummies. Fourth, the level 2 fixed-effect predictor IHDI is added. In the fifth full model, the interaction-terms between the Subjective Social Class Trajectory dummies and the IHDI will be added. For these full models, assumptions will be checked

Robustness

As a comparison to the study by Hertel and Schöneck (2022), I will also briefly investigate a model with aggregated conflict perceptions as the dependent variable.

An important note here is the slightly different conflict dimensions for Hertel and Schöneck (2022). The four conflict dimensions aggregated in their study were: poor people and rich people, the working and the middle class, management and workers, and people at the top of society and people at the bottom.

A second robustness check is related to the use of multi-level analysis. In multilevel analysis, the assumption is made that the level 2 units are independent and sampled from an infinite population. In practice there is no infinite sample of countries, and countries exhibit some level of co-dependency (geographically, culturally, economically). These problems have been noted by several authors in recent years (Kuppens & Pollet, 2014; Cleassens et al, 2023). Complex methodology exists to address this, which is beyond the scope of this study. However, as a robustness check the level 1 part of the analysis will be performed as a multivariate linear regression for each of the countries, to see if differences between the Subjective Social Class types are observed in these specific countries.

Complications

Based on the distribution of missing values, it was decided to only use complete cases. This reduced the sample from n = 44975 to n=34502. Excluding the non-complete cases, the countries of Slovenia and Japan were also excluded, reducing the total number of countries to $n_j = 27$.

The missing data came from a variety of sources. Firstly, because a small number of interviews (n=700) were only partially completed. It is important to note here that any interview that was more than 80 percent completed was deemed as complete. This means that beyond these 700, more interviews could not have been entirely completed. Thus, part of the missingness can be attributed to incomplete interviews.

Major sources of missingness where the following questions: "where do you think you will be 10 years from now (n=2949), what social class do you belong too (n=1901) and the five conflict types: rich and poor (n=2624), management and workers (n=4054), working and middle class (n=4054) young and old (n=2436), and immigrants and non-immigrants (n=2936).

Several significant differences between the complete and non-complete cases were observed. Appendix B contains an overview with the values of the complete vs non-complete cases. Due to the large sample size, a lot of the differences were statistically significant. However, I do not see most differences as problematic. For example, the average level of self-assessed social class differed by less than 0.2, which is small in contrast to the standard deviation of 1.79.

The most noteworthy difference was that women are overrepresented among the non-complete cases, making up 59 percent. The average age was 53 among the non-complete cases, compared to 48 for the complete cases. The difference in age might be attributed due to the high age of some of the respondents, with questions about for example manager and worker conflict more likely eliciting a non-response from older respondents. The non-complete cases also had relatively more people that perceived very high levels of conflict between young and old people, and between the working and

the middle class. Individuals of higher socio-economic status were also slightly overrepresented in the complete cases.

Further inspection on the missing's on specific items revealed no pattern beyond what was perceived in the complete vs non-complete cases. Although overall some minor differences were observed, no indication for a problematic non-missing at random was found.

The second complication is regarding model convergence. For a selection of the partial and full models convergence was not reached, even with increased iterations on the model. To try and address convergence, additional models have been estimated that are discussed in the robustness section.

Results

Univariate descriptives

Table 1: Descriptive statistics for variables as used in the statistical model (n=34502, c = 27)

Variable	*Average*[a]	*Std. deviation*	*Median*
Rich and poor conflict	1.37	0.84	1
Middle and lower class conflict	1.08	0.8	1
Management and worker conflict	1.39	0.8	1
Generational conflict	1.11	0.83	1
Migrant and non-migrant conflict	1.45	0.87	1
Age	48.42	16.94	48
Self-Assessed Social scale	5.38	1.79	6
Trajectory (Stable is reference)	Stable = 6281 (18%) Climbers = 4904 (14%) Fallers = 1174 (3.4%) other = 22143 (64%)		
SES (low = reference)	Low = 11664 (34%) Middle = 19571 (57%) High = 3267 (9.5%)		
Gender (Male = 0, Female = 1)	0=16553 (48%) 1 = 17949 (52%)		

[a] For nominal variables percentages are given

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics. The median respondent is a 48-year-old member of the middle class who perceives a low amount of conflict on the different dimensions. The dependent conflict variables all score quite low on average, with the conflict between middle and lower class as well as generational conflict variables scoring substantially lower. In figure 3, the average of the five conflict dimensions can be seen by country. The average conflict perception is lowest at below 1 on average with the respondents from Thailand, Croatia, Israel and the Czech Republic. While the average conflict

perceptions are highest at above 1.5 for the respondents from the United States, Chile, Italy and South Africa.

The average age of the sample is 48. On self-assessed social class, the median person considers themselves to be just above the halfway line. The gender split is quite balanced and there are relatively little high class individuals, representing just 9.5 percent of the data. Across the 27 countries, 4904 or 14 percent of people were categorized as social climbers. A small group of 1174, or just 3.4 percent of people were categorized as social fallers. 6281 people or 18 percent were categorized stable, with 22821 falling into other patterns.

Figure 4 shows an overview of the presence of the trajectory types by country, which answers the descriptive research question, the prevalence of the Subjective Social Class types. These types were present within all countries. The presence of social fallers ranges from 0.9 percent in Thailand to 10 percent in Russia. Social climbers range from 6.2 percent in Bulgaria to 24 percent in Taiwan. The stable group ranged from 5.5 percent in Venezuela to 28 percent in Bulgaria. Lastly, the lowest share of others was 57 percent for New Zealand, with the highest 77 percent for Venezuela. Appendix C.3 shows the exact percentages by country

These differences indicate cross-country differences in the prevalence of patterns of self-assessed social class and the changes.

Appendix C.1 gives an expansive overview of the univariate statistics. This includes average values on the variables by country, distribution of variables by country as well as some discussion on the items that were used to craft the Subjective Social Class Trajectories.



Figure 3: Average conflict level by country (n=34502, c = 27).[6]



Figure 4: Distribution of Subjective Social Class Types by country (n=34502, c=27). [6]

[6] See appendix A for country codes.

Bivariate descriptives

Table 2 shows the bivariate correlations of the variables used in the analysis. Overall, no large correlations were observed. There is a moderate level of correlation between the five conflict dimensions, ranging from r=0.39 ($p<0.01$) between middle class and generational conflict to r= .61 ($p<0.01$) between middle class and rich and poor conflict. The bivariate relationship between the dependent conflict variables and the independent variables revealed no major correlations. There is only a weak relation between IHDI and conflict perceptions, ranging from r=-0.15 ($p<0.01$) for migrant and non-migrant conflict, to r=-.28 ($p<-.01$) for middle and lower class conflict. Figure 5 shows the average conflict perception of the Subjective Social Class trajectories, no large differences between the groups were observed.

There is a moderate relationship between the Self-Assessed Social Class and SES[7] (r=.50, $p<0.01$). Some individuals who indicated themselves as lower or working class still thought of themselves as high on the social ladder, while the other way around, some people who thought of themselves as upper class members placed themselves low on subjective social class. IHDI and SES were also moderately related (-.40, $p<0.01$), It appears that higher IHDI is associated with higher overall class-identification within countries.

Appendix C.2 contains a more expansive discussion on the bivariate relations.

[7] Before being turned into the dummies

Table 2 Correlations between variables (n=34502)

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Self-assessed hierarchy place										
2. Rich and poor conflict	-.11**									
3. Middle-lower class conflict	-.10**	.61**								
4. Management-worker conflict	-.10**	.55**	.56**							
5. Generational conflict	-.06**	.45**	.50**	.48**						
6. Migrant conflict	-.01	.41**	.39**	.43**	.43**					
7. SES[1]	.50**	-.15**	-.19**	-.13**	-.11**	-.02**				
8. IHDI	.23**	-.21**	-.28**	-.17**	-.15**	-.03**	.40**			
9. Sex	-.04**	.06**	.06**	.04**	.04**	.06**	-.02**	-.01		
10. Age	.01	-.07**	-.09**	-.08**	-.07**	-.05**	.04**	-.01	.17**	

* indicates $p < .05$. ** indicates $p < .01$.
[1] Before dummy-fication (6-point scale here)



Figure 5: Boxplot, average social conflict perception by Subjective Social Class Trajectory type. (n=34502).

Analysis results

Overall model results

Table 3 through 7 contain the results of the multilevel analysis. The models were estimated in five steps. Using the empty model 1, I calculate the intraclass correlations (ICC) for each of the conflict dimensions: rich and poor (0.130), middle and lower class (0.097), management and workers (0.100), old and young (0.079) and migrants and non-migrants (0.174). Roughly 10 percent of the variation can be attributed to country-level variation in four of the dimensions, and 17.5 percent for migrant conflict. These values are all quite low, indicating that a large part of the variation is attributed to individual differences.

The overall pattern from model 1 through 5 is relatively similar for each of the conflict dimensions, with the primary difference being effect size and significance. The models in table 3 will be used as an example.

In model 2 in table 3 the fixed effects at level 1 are added, which shows some small but significant effects of the covariates. Men perceive slightly more conflict than women ($b = 0.084$, $p < 0.001$). As individuals get older, they perceive slightly less conflict ($b=-0.0029$, $p<0.001$). Middle class ($b=0.071$, $p<0.001$) and higher class ($b=-0.125$, $p<0.001$) individuals perceive less rich and poor conflict compared to lower class individuals. A higher subjective social class also predicts slightly lower conflict perception ($b=-0.015$, $p<0.001$). As the score on the conflict dimensions ranges from 0 through 3, these are not very large differences. These covariates remain the same throughout model 3 through 5.

As can be seen in model 2 through 4, the effects of the Subjective Social Trajectory Types are quite small and not always significant. Adding the random slopes for these Subjective Social Class types in model 3 only slightly changes the coefficients of the fixed effects. The same holds for model 4, where the addition of the level 2 fixed effect of IHDI barely changes the other coefficients.

Table 3: Dependent: perceived conflict between the rich and the poor, n = 34502, c = 27. (linear multilevel models)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3[a]		Model 4[a]		Model 5[a]	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
Fixed part										
Intercept	1.334***	0.058	1.513***	0.059	1.517***	0.060	2.367***	0.338	2.349***	0.346
Sex (0 = male, 1 = female)			0.084***	0.008	0.084***	0.008	0.084***	0.008	0.084***	0.008
Age*10			-0.029***	0.003	-0.029***	0.001	-0.027***	0.003	-0.003***	0.001
SES refer = lower										
SES Middle			-0.071***	0.001	-0.074***	0.010	-0.074***	0.010	-0.074***	0.010
SES high			-0.125***	0.017	-0.128***	0.018	-0.128***	0.018	-0.128***	0.018
SES-scale			-0.015***	0.002	-0.015***	-0.003	-0.015***	0.003	-0.015***	-0.003
Types refer =stable										
Fallers			0.106***	0.025	0.148**	0.052	0.146**	0.052	-0.464	0.323
Climbers			-0.028	0.015	0.028	0.024	0.028	0.024	-0.136	0.149
Other			0.031**	0.011	0.035	0.022	0.034	0.022	-0.007	0.146
IHDI							-1.07*	0.422	-1.051*	0.432
IHDI*Fallers									0.767'	0.403
IHDI*Climbers									0.209	0.187
IHDI* Other									0.050	0.181
Random part										
Country variance	0.092	0.303	0.084	0.290	0.083	0.289	0.070	0.264	0.069	0.263
Individual variance	0.616	0.785	0.609	0.781	0.606	0.779	0.606	0.779	0.606	0.779
Fallers					0.053	0.230	0.053	0.230	0.044	0.211
Climbers					0.009	0.093	0.008	0.092	0.008	0.087
Other					0.009	0.095	0.009	0.094	0.009	0.094
Deviance[b]	81355,8		81044.5		80919.6		80914.5		80913.4	
-2 log like[c]	-40676		-40487***		-40426***		-40424*		-40421	

***p < 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 'p<0.1

a = Model did not converge b=REML c = significance compared to previous model, with ML

Table 4 : Dependent: perceived conflict between the middle class and lower class, n = 34502, c = 27. (linear multilevel models)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3[a]		Model 4		Model 5[a]	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
Fixed part										
Intercept	1.036***	0.047	1.206***	0.049	1.204***	0.052	2.247***	0.221	2.368***	0.239
Sex (0 = male, 1 = female)			0.078***	0.008	0.074***	0.008	0.077***	-0.008	0.078***	0.008
Age*10			-0.025***	0.003	-0.025***	0.003	-0.025***	0.003	-0.024***	0.003
SES refer = lower										
SES Middle			-0.086***	0.010	-0.091***	0.010	-0.090***	0.010	-0.091***	0.010
SES high			-0.134***	0.017	-0.137***	0.017	-0.136***	0.017	-0.137***	0.017
SES-scale			-0.004	0.003	-0.003	0.003	-0.004	0.003	-0.003	0.003
Types refer =stable										
Fallers			-0.020	0.024	0.020	0.047	0.017	0.047	-0.585'	0.287
Climbers			-0.034*	0.015	-0.023	0.027	-0.027	0.027	-0.394*	0.154
Other			-0.009	-0.011	-0.004	0.025	-0.005	0.025	-0.117	0.166
IHDI							-1.315***	0.274	-1.469***	0.298
IHDI*Fallers									0.757*	0.358
IHDI*Climbers									0.467*	0.193
IHDI* Other									0.139	0,207
Random part										
Country variance	0.061	0.246	0.053	0.230	0.062	0.243	0.032	0.179	0.032	0.178
Individual variance	0.565	0.752	0.560	0.749	0.556	0.746	0.556	0.746	0.556	0.746
Fallers					0.040	0.200	0.041	0.202	0.033	0.248
Climbers					0.013	0.114	0.013	0.116	0.009	0.097
Other					0.014	0.116	0.013	0.114	0.013	0.114
Deviance[b]	78368.9		78124.7		77966.1		77956.2		77943.5	
-2 log like[c]	-39182		-39027***		-38494***		-38944***		-38935***	

***p < 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 'p<0.1

a = Model did not converge b=REML c = significance compared to previous model, with ML

Table: 5:: Dependent: perceived conflict between management and workers, n = 34502, c = 27. (linear multilevel models)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3[a]		Model 4		Model 5	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
Fixed part										
Intercept	1.359***	0.049	1.574***	0.052	1.580***	0.056	2.258***	0.297	2.378***	0.323
Sex (0 = male, 1 = female)			0.054***	0.008	0.054***	0.008	0.054***	0.008	0.054***	0.008
Age*10			-0.029***	0.003	-0.030***	0.003	-0.030***	0.003	-0.003***	0
SES refer = lower										
SES Middle			-0.058***	0.010	-0.063***	0.010	-0.063***	0.010	-0.063***	0.010
SES high			-0.097***	0.017	-0.101***	0.017	-0.101***	0.017	-0.010***	0.017
SES-scale			-0.021***	0.003	-0.021***	0.003	-0.021***	0.003	-0.021***	0.003
Types refer =stable										
Fallers			0.076**	0.024	0.106'	0.058	0.103'	0.058	-0.815*	0.341
Climbers			0.054***	0.015	0.054'	0.031	0.054'	0.031	-0.254	0.203
Other			0.041***	0.011	0.044	0.028	0.044	0.028	-0.212	0.185
IHDI							-0.855*	0.034	-1.006*	0.402
IHDI*Fallers									1.156*	0.425
IHDI*Climbers									0.388	0 254
IHDI* Other									0.322	0.230
Random part										
Country variance	0.065	0.255	0.060	0.245	0.072	0.269	0.060	0.244	0.059	0.244
Individual variance	0.583	0.764	0.578	0.760	0.572	0.756	0.572	0.756	0.572	0.756
Fallers					0.070	0.265	0.070	0.265	0.052	0.228
Climbers					0.020	0.140	0.019	0.139	0.018	0.136
Other					0.017	0.134	0.018	0.133	0.016	0.128
Deviance[b]	79472.1		79166		78933.1		78929.5		78924.2	
-2 log like[c]	-39734		-39548***		-39433***		-39431*		-39427*	

***p < 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 'p<0.1

a = Model did not converge b=REML c = significance compared to previous model, with ML

Table 6:: Dependent: perceived conflict between young and old people, n = 34502, c = 27. (linear multilevel models)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3[a]		Model 4[a]		Model 5	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
Fixed part										
Intercept	1.069****	0.046	1.234***	0.050	1.227***	0.053	1.674***	0.230	1.872***	0.308
Sex (0 = male, 1 = female)			0.062***	0.009	0.061***	0.009	0.061***	0.009	0.062***	0.009
Age*10			-0.033***	0.003	-0.033***	0.003	-0.033***	0.003	-0.033***	0.003
SES refer = lower										
SES Middle			-0.042***	0.010	-0.047***	0.010	-0.047***	0.010	-0.047***	0.010
SES high			-0.049***	0.018	-0.054**	0.018	-0.054**	0.018	-0.055**	0.018
SES-scale			-0.006*	0.003	-0.006*	0.003	-0.006*	0.003	-0.006*	0.003
Types refer =stable										
Fallers			0.073**	0.025	0.11	0.045	0.113*	0.045	-0.474	0.276
Climbers			0.005	0.016	0.025	0.032	-0.024	0.032	-0.563**	0.166
Other			0.033**	0.011	0.044'	0.021	0.044'	0.021	-0.151	0.137
IHDI							-0.564	0.368	-0.814*	0.384
IHDI*Fallers									0.736*	0.344
IHDI*Climbers									0.742**	0.207
IHDI* Other									0.243	0.170
Random part										
Country variance	0.055	0.235	0.055	0.24	0.063	0.250	0.056	0.237	0.054	0.232
Individual variance	0.637	0.799	0.632	0.795	0.628	0.793	0.628	0.793	0.628	0.793
Fallers					0.034	0.183	0.033	0.183	0.027	0.165
Climbers					0.019	0.139	0.019	0.140	0.010	0.101
Other					0.008	0.091	0.008	0.091	0.007	0.085
Deviance[b]	82454.4		82259.4		82136.1		82134.9		82124.6	
-2 log like[c]	-41225		-41095***		-41035***		-41034		-41026**	

***p < 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 'p<0.1

a = Model did not converge b=REML c = significance compared to previous model, with ML

Table 7: Dependent: perceived conflict between migrants and non-migrants, n = 34502, c = 27. (linear multilevel models)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3[a]		Model 4		Model 5[a]	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
Fixed part										
Intercept	1.431***	0.070	1.686***	0.076	1.688***	0.073	1.555**	0.477	1.567**	0.469
Sex (0 = male, 1 = female)			0.100***	0.009	0.100***	0.009	0.101***	0.009	0.100***	0.009
Age*10			-0.047***	0.003	-0.047***	0.003	-0.047***	0.003	-0.047***	0.003
SES refer = lower										
SES Middle			-0.033**	0.010	-0.036***	0.010	-0.036***	0.010	-0.036***	0.010
SES high			-0.041*	0.018	-0.044*	0.018	-0.044*	0.018	-0.044*	0.018
SES-scale			-0.018***	0.003	-0.018***	0.003	-0.018***	0.003	-0.018***	0.003
Types refer =stable										
Fallers			0.067**	0.025	0.100'	0.052	0.066	0.052	-0.532	0.323
Climbers			0.074***	0.015	0.080**	0.027	0.050**	0.020	-0.162	0.174
Other			0.025*	0.011	0.030	0.020	0.031	0.020	-0.211*	0.121
IHDI							0.167	0.594	0.155	0.585
IHDI*Fallers									0.791'	0.402
IHDI*Climbers									0.302	0.218
IHDI* Other									0.303'	0.151
Random part										
Country variance	0.133	0.364	0.144	0.380	0.130	0.360	0.134	0.360	0.130	0.360
Individual variance	0.633	0.796	0.623	0.789	0.619	0.787	0.619	0.787	0.619	0.787
Fallers					0.052	0.229	0.052	0.229	0.044	0.210
Climbers					0.012	0.011	0.013	0.112	0.012	0.109
Other					0.007	0.083	0.007	0.083	0.005	0.071
Deviance[b]	82295.7		81769.1		81662.3		81661.4		81659.2	
-2 log like[c]	-41146		-40850***		-40798***		-40798		-40795'	

***p < 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 'p<0.1

a = Model did not converge b=REML c = significance compared to previous model, with ML

Hypothesis 1 and 2

For all five conflict dimensions, there is a large change in the coefficient from model 4 to 5, when the interaction-terms are added. This can be seen in table 3 through 7. H1 stated that social fallers perceive higher levels of conflict than stable, climbers and the rest. The analysis does not support this hypothesis. The direction of the effect is always negative, meaning that social fallers perceive less conflict than social fallers. This effect was significant in only one of the models, in model 5 in table 5, for conflict between management and workers ($b=-0.815$, $p<0.05$). Social fallers perceive significantly less conflict than the stable group in management and worker conflict.

According to H2, social climbers perceive lower levels of conflict than the other groups. Moderate evidence for this hypothesis was found. The direction of the effect was negative in all models, and was significant in two of the models. In table 4 model 5, social climbers ($b=-0.395$, $p<0.05$) perceive significantly less conflict between the middle and the lower class compared to the stable group.[8]. Table 6 model 5 shows that social climbers perceive ($b=-0.563$, $p<0.01$) significantly less conflict between young and old people compared to the stable group.

Hypothesis 3

H3 states that individuals in countries with higher levels of IHDI will have lower levels of conflict perceptions. The fifth model in table 3 through 7 shows the results. Significantly less conflict is perceived between the rich and the poor ($b=-1.051$, $p<0.05$.), the middle and the lower class ($b=-1.469$, $p<0.001$), management and worker ($b=-1.006$, $p<0.05$) and young and old ($b=-0.814$, $p<0.05$). No evidence was found for migrant and non-migrant conflict ($b=0.155$, $p> 0.05$).

[8] Although the coefficient for social climbers ($b=-0.585$, $p<0.1$) is lower, this was not a significant effect

Hypothesis 4 and 5

Tables 3 through 7 shows the results for the interaction between IHDI and the subjective social class types. H4 stated that social fallers in countries with a higher IHDI perceive relatively less conflict than social fallers in societies with lower IHDI. The opposite to this was found across all five models. The direction of the interaction was positive, indicating higher conflict perceptions as IHDI increases for the social fallers compared to the stable group. This was significant for middle and lower class conflict ($b=0.757$, $p<0.05$), management and work conflict ($b=1.156$, $p<0.05$) and young and old conflict (0.736, $p<0.05$). Figure 6 shows a visualization of interaction for management and worker conflict. This shows that unlike hypothesized, social fallers perceive relatively less conflict in lower IHDI countries compared to the stable group, but perceive relatively more conflict in higher IHDI countries.

H4 stated that in countries with a higher IHDI, social climbers perceive relatively more conflict than in societies with lower IHDI. Significant evidence was found for middle and lower class conflict (0.467, $p<0.05$) and young and old conflict (0.742, $p<0.01$). Figure 7 contains a visualization of the evidence for H2,H3 and H5. The reductive effect of social climbers is not as strong when taken together with IHDI, with social climbers perceiving more conflict than the stable group in high IHDI countries.

Table 8 contains a summarization of the hypothesized effects. Regardless of significance, the direction of the effects is consistent across the five conflict dimensions. Compared to the stable group, social fallers and climbers predict lower conflict perceptions. This was only hypothesized for social climbers. Higher IHDI predicted significantly lower conflict perceptions as hypothesized in all models except for migrant and non-migrant conflict For the interaction, both social fallers and climbers predict higher conflict perception as IHDI increases. This was only hypothesized for social climbers.

Random effects

Lastly, a note on random effects. All results as described were found conditionally on the random effects. A random intercept was calculated, meaning the baseline level of conflict perceptions can vary between countries. Secondly, the random slopes for the Subjective Social Class Types means that the slopes of these dummies can also be different from country to country. Appendix D.2 contains an overview of these random effects, which includes confidence intervals. Of note here is the large confidence intervals of the random slopes for social fallers.

Table 9 shows the correlation of the random effects. There is a high level of correlation between the other group and social climbers for all five conflict dimensions. This can be understood as the random effects of both the other group and social climbers generally having the same direction. For middle and lower class conflict, the correlation between social climbers and social fallers is also high (0.74) indicating high level of co-directionality. Besides this, some weak correlations were found between social fallers and social climbers for middle and lower class conflict as well as migrant-non-migrant.

Table 8: Effects and standard errors of the hypothesis, pulled from final model from table 3 through 7 (N=34502)

	Rich and poor conflict		Middle & lower class conflict		Management and worker conflict		Young and old conflict		Migrant and non-migrant conflict	
	Coef	SE	Coef	Se	Coef	Se	Coef	Se	Coef	Se
Fallers	-0.464	0.323	-0.585'	0.287	-0.815*	0.341	-0.474	0.276	-0.532	0.323
Climbers	-0.136	0.149	-0.394*	0.154	-0.254	0.203	-0.563**	0.166	-0.162	0.174
IHDI	-1.051*	0.432	-1.469***	0.298	-1.006*	0.402	-0.814*	0.384	0.155	0.585
IHDI x Fallers	0.767'	0.403	0.757*	0.358	1.156*	0.425	0.736*	0.344	0.791'	0.402
IHDI X Climbers	0.209	0.187	0.467*	0.193	0.388	0.254	0.742**	0.207	0.302	0.218

Significance on ***p < 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 'p<0.1

Table 9: Correlation of random effects from model 5 from table 3 through 7 (n=34502)

	Rich and poor Conflict			Middle & lower class Conflict			Management and worker Conflict			Young and old conflict			Migrant and non-migrant conflict		
	Intercept	2	3	Intercept	2	3	Intercept	2	3	Intercept	2	3	Intercept	2	3
2 Fallers	0.06			0.05			0.11			0.06			0.08		
3 Climbers	0.11	-0.32		-0.13	-0.74		-0.21	0.06		-0.13	-0.17		0.20	0.35	
4 Others	-0.08	-0.35	0.89	-0.31	-0.37	0.88	-0.35	-0.06	0.80	-0.20	-0.19	0.82	0.30	-0.05	0.72





Figure 6: (left) Coefficient change between social fallers and the stable group based on IHDI. 0 is low IHDI (0.5) for fallers. High IHDI is 0.9. Dependent Management and worker conflict perceptions (n=34502)

Figure 7: (right) Coefficient change between social climbers and stable based on IDHI. 0 is low IHDI (0.5) for fallers, High IHDI is 0.9. Dependent Middle and Lower Class conflict perceptions (n= 34502)

Assumptions

Checking the assumptions for the models revealed minor issues that persisted across the five different models. Minor issues were detected with the random distribution of level 1 and 2 errors. This deviation was particularly prominent for the model with middle and lower class conflict as the dependent.

These assumption problems indicate that some of the results might have been influenced by influential outliers on the low or high end of conflict perceptions.

Regarding representativeness of the data, the ISSP provided weights for some countries used in the analysis. As it was not given for all countries, this was not used. This means that the data might not be fully representative of all countries included in the analysis.

Robustness

An analysis with conflict as a scale, similar to Hertel and Schöneck (2022), was performed. Appendix E.1 shows the results of this analysis. This analysis found significant effect on the interaction-terms between IHDI and social fallers and the interaction between IHDI and social climbers, but no direct difference between social fallers and social climbers with the stable group. Comparing these results to the models with separate conflict dimensions, the separate dimensions show clear differences in effect size and significance based on the dimensions.

Second, attempts were made to fix the convergence. Lack of convergence does not mean the model has to be discarded as the interpretation of the fixed effects generally remains the same (Bates et al., 2015, p.25), however it is still useful to see if convergence can be reached. The first attempt was done by calculating the models with maximum likelihood instead of restricted maximum likelihood.[9] These models showed no major differences in the effect sizes, but did push down the significance below $p<0.05$ for some of the effects (e.g. the social fallers slopes in the full model in table 4 and 5).

[9] For further reading on the difference between REML and ML I recommend Peugh (2010).

Investigating the assumptions of these models, it seemed to fit the data less well. REML is a stricter measurement, which adds robustness to the evidence that was found in the models reported in the main text.

The second attempt was by trying to fix overparameterization, which is a common issue in multilevel modelling (Bates et al., 2015). To attempt to fix this, the SES dummies were removed due to their moderate correlation to the Self-Assessed Social class variable. This did not fix the issue of convergence, and did not change the results of the models.

It is a well-known issue in multilevel modelling that countries are not true independent level 2 units. This is difficult to fix within constraints of this research project. Appendix E.2 shows performed multivariate linear regressions for each of the countries. These simple analyses aimed to see if differences between social fallers, social climbers and the stable group also appeared in individual country-analysis using only the level 1 part of the model. To summarize the additional analysis. For both social climbers and social fallers on all conflict dimensions some countries had significant differences, sometimes predicting higher and sometimes predicting lower conflict perceptions. The direction seemed to be generally negative in the lower IHDI countries where results were found, and positive in higher IHDI countries where results were found. This adds some robustness to the found interaction effect.

Discussion

This thesis investigated the presence of Subjective Social Class Trajectories and their explanation of variation in perceptions of social conflict in a cross-country analysis. Building upon the work of Hertel and Shöneck (2022), who investigated subjective stratification beliefs as predictors of conflict perceptions. This thesis improved on their work by disentangling dimensions of social conflict, and envisioning social class perceptions as dependent on past experiences and future expectation.

I hypothesised that individuals falling down the social ladder would attempt to avoid future loss, placing them in an insecure position where they are more likely to engage in conflict thinking. In contrast, individuals who perceive themselves as moving up the social ladder internalise their future gains, making them less loss avoidant thus less insecure about their status and less likely to engage in conflict thinking. I also hypothesised that there should be less perceived conflict in wealthier and more equal societies, and that country wealth and inequality works as a protective buffer, making the effect of social falling or climbing less strong.

I drew the following conclusions from the analysis: Firstly, the Subjective Social Class Types were present in all countries. Secondly, movement on the social ladder for social climbers and social fallers was significantly different to that of the stable group three out of ten times. Thirdly, these effects were always negative, indicating lower conflict perceptions for social climbers and fallers compared to those with stable social status. Fourthly IHDI predicted lower conflict perceptions on all conflict dimensions except migration. Fifthly, the interaction terms had a significant effect five out of ten times and always in the same direction. The interaction between IHDI and social climbers and fallers indicates that, compared to individuals with a stable perception of their social class, conflict perceptions are expected to increase as IHDI rises. These results were as hypothesised for the effect of IHDI on social climbers, but the opposite of what was hypothesised for social fallers.

These results showed that distinct effect size and significance between the different conflict dimensions. This combined with the found effect of the Subjective Social Class Types, shows that disentangling conflict dimensions, as well as taking into account perceived class mobility is a useful tool in understanding conflict perceptions. The finding regarding IHDI add confirmation to the result of Hertel and Schöneck (2022) that country level differences need to be accounted for in analysis of conflict perception.

To reflect on these results in light of this theory. I hypothesised that the effect of social fallers and social climbers would be in opposite directions, but they the opposite was true. This suggests that, compared to socially stable or immobile individuals, social mobile individuals may exhibit similar patterns. It appears that social climbers also engage in more conflict thinking compared to the stable group in wealthier and more equal countries. One possible explanation is that social climbers are still heavily influenced by their previous social position (Manstead, 2018). Rather than feeling relieved about their achievements since their upbringing, they remain insecure about their social status and exhibit strong loss aversion, despite expecting to be better off in the future.

Another possible explanation is that the dynamics of being socially immobile differ based on a country's wealth. In lower IHDI countries, for example, expecting social stability might be desirable in light of a less stable political environment. In wealthier countries, however, the baseline expectation might be that one will be better off in the future, which makes social stability a sign of failure.

I will now briefly explain how to understand the results on individual conflict dimensions. The evidence for the different dimensions can be contextualised. The findings for social climbers on conflict between the middle and lower classes and generational conflict, are partially consistent with the proposed mechanisms. In particular, in lower IHDI countries, the anticipated benefits of social climbing lead to greatly increased internalised benefits that lead to lower conflict perceptions. However, in higher IHDI countries, social climbers

actually perceive more generational and middle-lower class conflict than the stable group. Generational conflict is becoming more and more an issue in wealthy western countries (Chauvel & Schröder, 2014). Social climbers in particular are in conflict with older generations because the latter hold the positions that the former want. This line of reasoning can also be extended to conflict between the middle and lower classes, where social climbers perceive their potential gains as being in direct competition with those of other social climbers (Gough, 1992). This may be further driven by fears about the disappearance of the middle class (Pressman, 2007; 2010).

For the findings of social fallers on management and worker conflict, this can be understood in light on the different nature of work in wealthier and less wealthy countries. In less wealthy countries, work is often seasonal, creating a system of high job insecurity (Mobarak & Reimão, 2020). In wealthier countries, people will often work in the same place for a very long time. Work becomes a source of high tension for social fallers. Losing one's job, working fewer hours, or failing to receive a pay rise can all confirm the fear of falling down the social ladder (Lee et al., 2018).
The lack of finding on the migrant dimension is in line with previous work (McLaren & Johnson, 2008; Dennison & Geddes, 2021).. The recent electoral success of strongly anti-immigrant parties across the world further shows that relatively straightforward demographics may no longer be sufficient for understanding anti-immigration attitudes.

To discuss some of the limitation of this thesis. An important note regarding all these results is that none of the hypotheses were supported simultaneously by any of the models. This could be partly attributed to the low prevalence of social fallers and social climbers in some countries. It is also possible that the psychological processes described for social fallers and social climbers partially apply to individuals not included in the categorisation. The moderate correlation of the random effects in the analysis suggests this may be the case. Further refining the categorisations might provide more clarity. Another related issue is the possible overlapping nature of concepts. Future gains and losses often weigh heavily on the mind (Knight & Gunatilaka, 2012; Kahneman et al.,

1991). It may be difficult to acquire information, as individuals might be unable to separate their current situation from their future expectations.

Some other limitations of the study are related to the analysis performed. Coding of the conflict dimensions meant there were only four possible answers, which is not optimal for performing linear regression. This could explain some of the issues with fitting the data. Additionally, the study lacked some relevant covariates, such as an individual's immigration status or whether they work as a manager. These covariates could have made the findings more robust. Lastly, lower IHDI countries were underrepresented in the sample. Although the discovered trend may hold for the countries researched, it cannot be generalised to all low IHDI countries. The study also did not include an outlier or power analysis as these are not straightforward to perform in multilevel analysis.

Conclusion

This thesis investigated whether people's perceptions of their social class could be used to categorise them into subjective social class trajectories, thereby explaining the level of wealth and inequality in a country. The analysis revealed that these types were present in all countries. There was moderate evidence that socially mobile individuals perceived lower levels of conflict than socially stable individuals in countries with a lower IHDI, and higher levels of conflict in countries with a higher IHDI. It was hypothesised that social fallers and social climbers would move in opposite directions, but this was not the case. Some evidence of this interaction was found in the conflict dimensions between young and old people, middle and lower classes, and management and workers. Evidence of the effect of country wealth and inequality was found on all dimensions except immigrant conflict. However, these results were nuanced by some methodological limitations.

Building upon the work of Hertel and Schöneck (2022), the analysis showed that expanding the assessment to include subjective social class trajectories is meaningful, as is disentangling conflict dimensions, as this provides a more nuanced understanding of social conflict. Perceptions of conflict and the dynamics surrounding it also vary from country to country.

To further build on and refine these findings, future research should focus on two elements. Firstly, the psychological mechanisms underpinning social mobility are underdeveloped. Due to the dynamic results for social fallers, social climbers, and the stable group, it is difficult to determine whether and how conflict thinking is particularly relevant here. Secondly, strong methodological considerations for multilevel modelling must be taken into account in future. More powerful analyses that can address some of the limitations of multilevel modelling, such as incorporating regional co-dependency into the analysis, can strengthen future research.

A better understanding of the mechanisms around conflict thinking, conflict perception and class dynamics are foundational for future research on this subject.

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Appendix A Country codes.

Table 10: Country codes from ISSP (ISSP Research Group, 2022).

Code	Country
AT	Austria
AU	Australia
BG	Bulgaria
CH	Switzerland
CL	Chile
CZ	Czech Republic
DE	Germany
DK	Denmark
FI	Finland
FR	France
GB (-GBN)	Great Britain
HR	Croatia
IL	Israel
IS	Iceland
IT	Italy
JP	Japan
LT	Lithuania
NO	Norway
NZ	New Zealand
PH	Philippines
RU	Russia
SE	Sweden
SI	Slovenia
SR	Suriname
TH	Thailand
TW	Taiwan
US	United States
VE	Venezuela
ZA	South Africa

Table 10 shows the country codes for reference for graphs. Same as the codes that came with the data when sources from the ISSP 2019 Social Inequality V panel (ISSP Research Group, 2022), only changed GB-GBN to GB for readability of the graphs.

Appendix B: Missing Data

Table 11: Univariate statistics of complete vs non-complete cases (n=44975).

	0, N = 34,502[1]	**1**, N = 10,473[1]	**p-value**[2]
Country			<0.001
AT	1,115 (3.2%)	146 (1.4%)	
AU	826 (2.4%)	242 (2.3%)	
BG	855 (2.5%)	296 (2.8%)	
CH	2,482 (7.2%)	560 (5.3%)	
CL	1,217 (3.5%)	157 (1.5%)	
CZ	1,649 (4.8%)	275 (2.6%)	
DE	973 (2.8%)	352 (3.4%)	
DK	771 (2.2%)	267 (2.5%)	
FI	764 (2.2%)	202 (1.9%)	
FR	1,293 (3.7%)	305 (2.9%)	
GB	1,307 (3.8%)	417 (4.0%)	
HR	913 (2.6%)	87 (0.8%)	
IL	988 (2.9%)	213 (2.0%)	
IS	1,053 (3.1%)	174 (1.7%)	

	0, N = 34,502[1]	**1**, N = 10,473[1]	**p-value**[2]
IT	1,021 (3.0%)	194 (1.9%)	
JP	0 (0%)	1,473 (14%)	
LT	741 (2.1%)	309 (3.0%)	
NO	1,066 (3.1%)	257 (2.5%)	
NZ	1,012 (2.9%)	198 (1.9%)	
PH	3,723 (11%)	527 (5.0%)	
RU	1,334 (3.9%)	263 (2.5%)	
SE	1,265 (3.7%)	371 (3.5%)	
SI	0 (0%)	1,164 (11%)	
SR	668 (1.9%)	333 (3.2%)	
TH	1,148 (3.3%)	385 (3.7%)	
TW	1,669 (4.8%)	257 (2.5%)	
US	1,426 (4.1%)	426 (4.1%)	
VE	878 (2.5%)	241 (2.3%)	
ZA	2,345 (6.8%)	382 (3.6%)	
Self-Assessed Social Class 10-scale	5.38 (1.79)	5.08 (1.77)	<0.001

	0, N = 34,502[1]	**1**, N = 10,473[1]	**p-value**[2]
Unknown	0	726	
Self-Assessed Past Social Class 10-scale	5.08 (1.94)	4.94 (1.97)	<0.001
Unknown	0	682	
Self-Assessed Future Social Class 10-scale	5.99 (2.03)	5.54 (2.12)	<0.001
Unknown	0	2,964	
age	48 (17)	53 (19)	<0.001
Unknown	0	294	
sex			<0.001
1 Male	16,553 (48%)	4,416 (43%)	
2 Female	17,949 (52%)	5,972 (57%)	
Unknown	0	85	
SES			<0.001
1 Lower class	3,823 (11%)	889 (10%)	
2 Working Class	7,841 (23%)	2,116 (25%)	
3 Lower middle class	6,945 (20%)	1,849 (22%)	
4 Middle class	12,626 (37%)	3,085 (36%)	
5 Upper middle class	3,045 (8.8%)	562 (6.6%)	
6 Upper class	222 (0.6%)	71 (0.8%)	

	0, N = 34,502[1]	**1**, N = 10,473[1]	**p-value**[2]
Unknown	0	1,901	
Rich and poor conflict			<0.001
1 Very strong conflicts	3,593 (10%)	653 (8.3%)	
2 Strong conflicts	10,180 (30%)	2,284 (29%)	
3 Not very strong conflicts	16,035 (46%)	3,790 (48%)	
4 There are no conflicts	4,694 (14%)	1,122 (14%)	
Unknown	0	2,624	
Middle and lower class conflict			<0.001
1 Very strong conflicts	1,879 (5.4%)	214 (3.3%)	
2 Strong conflicts	6,937 (20%)	1,068 (17%)	
3 Not very strong conflicts	17,815 (52%)	3,441 (54%)	
4 There are no conflicts	7,871 (23%)	1,696 (26%)	
Unknown	0	4,054	
Management and worker conflict			<0.001
1 Very strong conflicts	3,146 (9.1%)	595 (7.7%)	
2 Strong conflicts	10,978 (32%)	2,567 (33%)	
3 Not very strong conflicts	16,475 (48%)	3,745 (48%)	

	0, N = 34,502[1]	**1**, N = 10,473[1]	**p-value**[2]
4 There are no conflicts	3,903 (11%)	840 (11%)	
Unknown	0	2,726	
Young and old conflict			<0.001
1 Very strong conflicts	2,220 (6.4%)	376 (4.7%)	
2 Strong conflicts	7,534 (22%)	1,616 (20%)	
3 Not very strong conflicts	16,697 (48%)	4,070 (51%)	
4 There are no conflicts	8,051 (23%)	1,975 (25%)	
Unknown	0	2,436	
Migrant and non-migrant conflict			<0.001
1 Very strong conflicts	4,019 (12%)	671 (8.9%)	
2 Strong conflicts	12,118 (35%)	2,568 (34%)	
3 Not very strong conflicts	13,635 (40%)	3,177 (42%)	
4 There are no conflicts	4,730 (14%)	1,094 (15%)	
Unknown	0	2,963	
IHDI	0.77 (0.13)	0.80 (0.12)	<0.001

[1] Mean (SD); n (%)

[2] Welch Two Sample t-test; Pearson's Chi-squared test

Table 11 show the values of the complete vs non-complete cases. Due to the large sample, difference in scores will more quickly be statistically significant. I consider these difference not problematic. For example, the difference between the complete and non-complete cases on self-assessed social class has a difference of .29 on the score, compared to the standard deviation of 1.79 for the complete cases. While this is very slightly lower, I do not draw a major conclusion from this. As discussed in the main text, some minor difference in conflict perceptions were observed. The sex distribution was also different between the complete and non-complete cases. As part of this missingness can be attributed to non-finished interviews it's hard to draw major conclusions.

Japan and Slovenia had no answer on one of the variables. The first on one of the middle and lower class conflict perceptions, Slovenia on the SES item. Japan was excluded to keep the sample consistent between the models. Besides these, the percent of missing cases per country is relatively consistent

Appendix C Expanded results

This chapter includes an expanded overview of univariate and bivariate statistics that did not make it into the main text. It also includes the graphs of the random effects of the models.

C.1 Univariate statistics

C.1.1 Univariate statistics before changes for model

Table 12: Unedited univariate statistics (n=44975)

Q13a [TOPBOT] Groups tending towards top+bottom. Where would you put yourself on this scale?	5.00 (4.00, 6.00)
Unknown	726
Q13b Where did the family that you grew up in, fit in then?	5.00 (4.00, 6.00)
Unknown	682
Q13c Ahead 10 years from now, where do you think you will be on this scale?	6.00 (5.00, 7.00)
Unknown	2,964
Age of respondent	50 (35, 63)
Unknown	294
Sex of Respondent	
1 Male	20,969 (47%)
2 Female	23,921 (53%)
Unknown	85
Q22 Which social class would you say you belong to?	
1 Lower class	4,712 (11%)

2 Working Class	9,957 (23%)
3 Lower middle class	8,794 (20%)
4 Middle class	15,711 (36%)
5 Upper middle class	3,607 (8.4%)
6 Upper class	293 (0.7%)
Unknown	1,901
Q12a Conflicts in [COUNTRY]: Between poor people and rich people?	
1 Very strong conflicts	4,246 (10%)
2 Strong conflicts	12,464 (29%)
3 Not very strong conflicts	19,825 (47%)
4 There are no conflicts	5,816 (14%)
Unknown	2,624
Q12b Conflicts: Between the working class and the middle class?	
1 Very strong conflicts	2,093 (5.1%)
2 Strong conflicts	8,005 (20%)
3 Not very strong conflicts	21,256 (52%)
4 There are no conflicts	9,567 (23%)
Unknown	4,054
Q12c Conflicts: Between management and workers?	
1 Very strong conflicts	3,741 (8.9%)

2 Strong conflicts	13,545 (32%)
3 Not very strong conflicts	20,220 (48%)
4 There are no conflicts	4,743 (11%)
Unknown	2,726
Q12d Conflicts: Between young people and older people?	
1 Very strong conflicts	2,596 (6.1%)
2 Strong conflicts	9,150 (22%)
3 Not very strong conflicts	20,767 (49%)
4 There are no conflicts	10,026 (24%)
Unknown	2,436
Q12e Conflicts: Between people born in [COUNTRY] and people from other countries who have come to live in [COUNTRY]?	
1 Very strong conflicts	4,690 (11%)
2 Strong conflicts	14,686 (35%)
3 Not very strong conflicts	16,812 (40%)
4 There are no conflicts	5,824 (14%)
Unknown	2,963
IHDI	0.85 (0.71, 0.88)

[1] Median (IQR); n (%)

C.1.2 Univariate statistics for models

Table 13: Univariate statistics for all variables after creation (n=34502)

Self-Assessed Social Class 10-scale	4.38 (1.79)
Rich and poor conflict	
There are no conflicts	4,694 (14%)
Not very strong conflicts	16,035 (46%)
Strong conflicts	10,180 (30%)
Very strong conflicts	3,593 (10%)
Middle and lower class conflict	
There are no conflicts	7,871 (23%)
Not very strong conflicts	17,815 (52%)
Strong conflicts	6,937 (20%)
Very strong conflicts	1,879 (5.4%)
Management and worker conflict	
There are no conflicts	3,903 (11%)
Not very strong conflicts	16,475 (48%)
Strong conflicts	10,978 (32%)
Very strong conflicts	3,146 (9.1%)
Young and old conflict	
There are no conflicts	8,051 (23%)
Not very strong conflicts	16,697 (48%)

Strong conflicts	7,534 (22%)
Very strong conflicts	2,220 (6.4%)
Migrant and non-migrant conflict	
There are no conflicts	4,730 (14%)
Not very strong conflicts	13,635 (40%)
Strong conflicts	12,118 (35%)
Very strong conflicts	4,019 (12%)
Subjective Social Class types	
stable	6,281 (18%)
climbers	4,904 (14%)
fallers	1,174 (3.4%)
other	22,143 (64%)
SES	
low	11,664 (34%)
middle	19,571 (57%)
high	3,267 (9.5%)
Sex	
Male	16,553 (48%)
Female	17,949 (52%)
Age	48 (17)

[1] Mean (SD); n (%)

Table 13 contains the univariate statistics as used in the models. This overview is similar to what is discussed in the main text. Being able to see the distribution on the conflict dimensions more clearly shows that in general, most respondents reported perceiving at least some level of conflict.

C.1.3 Presence of Subjective Social Class types by country.

Table 13 contains the exact presence of each of the Subjective Social Class Trajectory types by country. Very few individuals perceive themselves as social fallers in several South-East Asian countries: Taiwan (1.5%), Thailand (0.9%) and the Philippines (1%), possibly indicating a major improvement in living standards over the last generations in these places. On the contrary the former communist/socialist States of Russia (10%), Bulgaria (6.2%) and Croatia (7.1%) display some of the highest amount of social fallers. For the climbers, Taiwan (24%), Iceland(23%) New Zealand (20%) spring out as high while Bulgaria (6.2%), Italy (6.7%) and Russia (7.3%) stand out on the low end. For the stable group, Bulgaria (28%), Czech Republic (29%) and Italy (26%) stand out. Some of the countries with a lot of people who perceive their social class as stable over time also have a low amount of social climbers and a high amount of social fallers.

Table 13. Presence of Subjective Social Class Trajectory Types by country (n=34502, c=27).

Countries	**AT**, N = 1,115[1]	**AU**, N = 826[1]	**BG**, N = 855[1]	**CH**, N = 2,482[1]	**CL**, N = 1,217[1]	**CZ**, N = 1,649[1]	**DE**, N = 973[1]	**DK**, N = 771[1]	**FI**, N = 764[1]	**FR**, N = 1,293[1]	**GB**, N = 1,307[1]	**HR**, N = 913[1]	**IL**, N = 988[1]	**IS**, N = 1,053[1]	**IT**, N = 1,021[1]
SES types.															
stable	176 (16%)	148 (18%)	243 (28%)	417 (17%)	207 (17%)	485 (29%)	166 (17%)	129 (17%)	122 (16%)	248 (19%)	283 (22%)	187 (20%)	156 (16%)	199 (19%)	264 (26%)
climbers	106 (9.5%)	107 (13%)	67 (7.8%)	302 (12%)	234 (19%)	137 (8.3%)	155 (16%)	111 (14%)	81 (11%)	120 (9.3%)	122 (9.3%)	100 (11%)	226 (23%)	159 (15%)	68 (6.7%)
fallers	13 (1.2%)	42 (5.1%)	53 (6.2%)	86 (3.5%)	18 (1.5%)	36 (2.2%)	52 (5.3%)	25 (3.2%)	36 (4.7%)	52 (4.0%)	49 (3.7%)	65 (7.1%)	19 (1.9%)	21 (2.0%)	39 (3.8%)
other	820 (74%)	529 (64%)	492 (58%)	1,677 (68%)	758 (62%)	991 (60%)	600 (62%)	506 (66%)	525 (69%)	873 (68%)	853 (65%)	561 (61%)	587 (59%)	674 (64%)	650 (64%)

[1] n (%)

Table 13 (continued).

Countries	**LT**, N = 741[1]	**NO**, N = 1,066[1]	**NZ**, N = 1,012[1]	**PH**, N = 3,723[1]	**RU**, N = 1,334[1]	**SE**, N = 1,265[1]	**SR**, N = 668[1]	**TH**, N = 1,148[1]	**TW**, N = 1,669[1]	**US**, N = 1,426[1]	**VE**, N = 878[1]	**ZA**, N = 2,345[1]
SES types												
stable	174 (23%)	173 (16%)	191 (19%)	335 (9.0%)	306 (23%)	226 (18%)	64 (9.6%)	254 (22%)	239 (14%)	317 (22%)	48 (5.5%)	524 (22%)
climbers	78 (11%)	143 (13%)	200 (20%)	833 (22%)	97 (7.3%)	162 (13%)	117 (18%)	111 (9.7%)	407 (24%)	221 (15%)	123 (14%)	317 (14%)
fallers	39 (5.3%)	36 (3.4%)	42 (4.2%)	38 (1.0%)	106 (7.9%)	60 (4.7%)	68 (10%)	10 (0.9%)	25 (1.5%)	57 (4.0%)	28 (3.2%)	59 (2.5%)
other	450 (61%)	714 (67%)	579 (57%)	2,517 (68%)	825 (62%)	817 (65%)	419 (63%)	773 (67%)	998 (60%)	831 (58%)	679 (77%)	1,445 (62%)

[1] n (%)

C.1.4 Frequency graphs

Frequency graphs of all the variables .



Figures 8-15 (left to right): Frequency histograms. Figure 8 the bars represent a different country. Figure 10-12 represents the items used to create the subjective social class trajectory types. Figure 13-15 are the change scores between these.



Figures 16-20 (left to right): Frequency histograms of the five dimensions of conflict perceptions (n=34502).

Figure 8 shows that the sample is quite old, with respondents up to a 100 years old.

Figure 9 shows that IHDI is a very left-skewed variable, relatively little low IHDI countries are present in the dataset. Looking at the past, future and present self-placement in figure 10-12 shows a lot of people place themselves right in the middle in past and present, but with slightly more optimism in the future. This is also confirmed by the change scores in figure 13-15. Generally a lot of people see no or little change, but past and present to the future people are generally more positive.

C.1.5 Average value by country

I have kept these graphs larger to maintain readability of the labels.



Figure 21: Average rich and poor conflict perception by country (n=34502)



Figure 22: Average middle and lower class conflict perception by country(n=34502)



Figure 23: Average manager and worker conflict perception by country (n=34502).



Figure 24: Average young and old conflict perception by country (n=34502).



Figure 25: Average migrant and non-migrant conflict perception by country (n=34502).



Figure 26: Average age by country (n=34502).



Figure 27: Average self-assessed social class by country (n=34520).



Figure 28: Average self-assessed future social class by country (n=34502)



Figure 29: Average self-assessed past social class by country (n=34502)



Figure 30: Average change in self-assessed social class from past to future by country (n=34502)



Figure 31: Average change in self-assessed social class from present to future by country (n=34502)



Figure 32: Average change in self-assessed social class from past to present by country (n=34502)

To briefly discuss these differences by country. Figures 21-25 show quite the difference in average conflict perceptions. Figure 25 for example, shows that the average migrant and non-migrant conflict perceptions differ by more than a point between Thailand and Italy. Figure 26 shows that the average age is quite comparable between countries. Figures 27-30 show that there is quite some difference between self-assessed social class across the three timepoints. With a difference of two points between the lowest and the highest average. Figure 30-32 shows the average change between these 3 points. In figure 30, some countries such as Taiwan and the Philippines are very hopeful from past to the future, while for Russia and Bulgaria on average there is no or barely any improvement. From the present to the future, Venezuela and Philippines stand out in figure 31 with large expected improvements, while Australia, France and Finland expect stability. In figure 32, from past to present shows countries where people feel they were better off in the past. Venezuela, Russia and Bulgaria stand out here, which could be related to geopolitical issues for Venezuela and the fall of the Soviet block for Russia and Bulgaria.

C.1.6 Frequency graphs by country

In this section, grids are provided with the frequency histogram on each variable by country.



Figure 33: Frequency histogram rich and poor conflict perceptions per country (n=34502, c=27)



Figure 34: Frequency histogram middle and lower class conflict perceptions per country (n=34502, c=27)



Figure 35: Frequency histogram management and worker conflict perceptions per country (n=34502, c=27)



Figure 36: Frequency histogram young and old conflict perceptions per country (n=34502, c=27)



Figure 37: Frequency histogram migrant and non-migrant conflict perceptions per country (n=34502, c=27)



Figure 38: Frequency histogram age per country (n=34502, c=27)



Figure 39: Frequency histogram Self-Assessed Social class per country (n=34502, c=27)



Figure 40: Frequency histogram Self-Assessed future social class per country (n=34502, c=27)



Figure 41: Frequency histogram Self-Assessed past social class per country (n=34502, c=27)



Figure 42: Frequency histogram change in Self-Assessed social class past to present per country (n=34502, c=27)



Figure 43: Frequency histogram change in Self-Assessed social class past to future per country (n=34502, c=27)



Figure 44: Frequency histogram change in Self-Assessed social class present to future per country (n=34502, c=27)

C.2 Bivariate statistics

C.2.1 Univariate statistics difference by sex

Table 14: Values on the items by sex (n=34502)

	Male, N = 16,553[1]	**Female**, N = 17,949[1]
Self-Assessed Social Class 10-scale	4.00 (3.00, 6.00)	4.00 (3.00, 5.00)
Rich and poor conflict		
There are no conflicts	2,480 (15%)	2,214 (12%)
Not very strong conflicts	7,984 (48%)	8,051 (45%)
Strong conflicts	4,485 (27%)	5,695 (32%)
Very strong conflicts	1,604 (9.7%)	1,989 (11%)
Middle and lower class conflict		
There are no conflicts	4,131 (25%)	3,740 (21%)
Not very strong conflicts	8,546 (52%)	9,269 (52%)
Strong conflicts	3,054 (18%)	3,883 (22%)
Very strong conflicts	822 (5.0%)	1,057 (5.9%)
Management and worker conflict		
There are no conflicts	2,003 (12%)	1,900 (11%)
Not very strong conflicts	8,127 (49%)	8,348 (47%)
Strong conflicts	5,010 (30%)	5,968 (33%)
Very strong conflicts	1,413 (8.5%)	1,733 (9.7%)
Young and old conflict		
There are no conflicts	4,147 (25%)	3,904 (22%)
Not very strong conflicts	7,994 (48%)	8,703 (48%)
Strong conflicts	3,418 (21%)	4,116 (23%)
Very strong conflicts	994 (6.0%)	1,226 (6.8%)
Migrant and non-migrant conflict		
There are no conflicts	2,435 (15%)	2,295 (13%)
Not very strong conflicts	6,956 (42%)	6,679 (37%)

	Male, N = 16,553[1]	**Female**, N = 17,949[1]
Strong conflicts	5,437 (33%)	6,681 (37%)
Very strong conflicts	1,725 (10%)	2,294 (13%)
types.f		
stable	2,967 (18%)	3,314 (18%)
climbers	2,382 (14%)	2,522 (14%)
fallers	510 (3.1%)	664 (3.7%)
other	10,694 (65%)	11,449 (64%)
ses.f		
low	5,579 (34%)	6,085 (34%)
middle	9,250 (56%)	10,321 (58%)
high	1,724 (10%)	1,543 (8.6%)
age	49 (35, 62)	48 (34, 61)

[1] Median (IQR); n (%)

Table 14 shows the difference by sex. Men seem to have slightly higher social class men.

On all conflict dimensions, women perceives slightly more conflict.

C.2.2 Difference based on SES

Table 15: Difference on values based on SES

	low, N = 11,664[1]	**middle**, N = 19,571[1]	**high**, N = 3,267[1]
Self-Assessed Social Class 10-scale	4.00 (2.00, 4.00)	5.00 (4.00, 6.00)	6.00 (6.00, 7.00)
Rich and poor conflict			
There are no conflicts	1,638 (14%)	2,568 (13%)	488 (15%)
Not very strong conflicts	4,217 (36%)	9,896 (51%)	1,922 (59%)
Strong conflicts	3,990 (34%)	5,501 (28%)	689 (21%)
Very strong conflicts	1,819 (16%)	1,606 (8.2%)	168 (5.1%)
Middle and lower class conflict			
There are no conflicts	2,352 (20%)	4,600 (24%)	919 (28%)
Not very strong conflicts	5,152 (44%)	10,771 (55%)	1,892 (58%)
Strong conflicts	3,146 (27%)	3,421 (17%)	370 (11%)
Very strong conflicts	1,014 (8.7%)	779 (4.0%)	86 (2.6%)
Management and worker conflict			
There are no conflicts	1,432 (12%)	2,117 (11%)	354 (11%)
Not very strong conflicts	4,502 (39%)	10,039 (51%)	1,934 (59%)
Strong conflicts	4,234 (36%)	5,935 (30%)	809 (25%)
Very strong conflicts	1,496 (13%)	1,480 (7.6%)	170 (5.2%)
Young and old conflict			
There are no conflicts	2,662 (23%)	4,562 (23%)	827 (25%)
Not very strong conflicts	4,954 (42%)	9,989 (51%)	1,754 (54%)
Strong conflicts	2,992 (26%)	3,980 (20%)	562 (17%)
Very strong conflicts	1,056 (9.1%)	1,040 (5.3%)	124 (3.8%)
Migrant and non-migrant conflict			
There are no conflicts	2,016 (17%)	2,391 (12%)	323 (9.9%)
Not very strong conflicts	4,001 (34%)	8,170 (42%)	1,464 (45%)

	low, N = 11,664[1]	**middle**, N = 19,571[1]	**high**, N = 3,267[1]
Strong conflicts	3,889 (33%)	7,058 (36%)	1,171 (36%)
Very strong conflicts	1,758 (15%)	1,952 (10.0%)	309 (9.5%)
types.f			
stable	2,195 (19%)	3,505 (18%)	581 (18%)
climbers	1,567 (13%)	2,828 (14%)	509 (16%)
fallers	491 (4.2%)	632 (3.2%)	51 (1.6%)
other	7,411 (64%)	12,606 (64%)	2,126 (65%)
sex.f			
Male	5,579 (48%)	9,250 (47%)	1,724 (53%)
Female	6,085 (52%)	10,321 (53%)	1,543 (47%)
age	48 (34, 61)	49 (35, 62)	49 (36, 62)

[1] Median (IQR); n (%)

Table 15 shows difference based on socio-economic status. There is a clear distinct pattern of conflict perception across the three class indicators. The social fallers group also has relatively more members among lower class members. Higher self-assessed social class on the scale as you go from low to middle to high social class.

C.2.3 Difference based on Subjective Social Class type

Table 15: Difference on values based on Subjective Social Class types (n=34502)

Characteristic	**stable**, N = 6,281[1]	**climbers**, N = 4,904[1]	**fallers**, N = 1,174[1]	**other**, N = 22,143[1]
Self-Assessed Social Class 10-scale	4.00 (4.00, 6.00)	5.00 (4.00, 6.00)	4.00 (3.00, 5.00)	4.00 (3.00, 6.00)
Rich and poor conflict				
There are no conflicts	925 (15%)	651 (13%)	170 (14%)	2,948 (13%)
Not very strong conflicts	2,972 (47%)	2,261 (46%)	455 (39%)	10,347 (47%)
Strong conflicts	1,740 (28%)	1,449 (30%)	382 (33%)	6,609 (30%)
Very strong conflicts	644 (10%)	543 (11%)	167 (14%)	2,239 (10%)
Middle and lower class conflict				
There are no conflicts	1,498 (24%)	1,060 (22%)	307 (26%)	5,006 (23%)
Not very strong conflicts	3,263 (52%)	2,536 (52%)	572 (49%)	11,444 (52%)
Strong conflicts	1,099 (17%)	1,056 (22%)	239 (20%)	4,543 (21%)
Very strong conflicts	421 (6.7%)	252 (5.1%)	56 (4.8%)	1,150 (5.2%)
Management and worker conflict				
There are no conflicts	827 (13%)	499 (10%)	160 (14%)	2,417 (11%)
Not very strong conflicts	3,032 (48%)	2,278 (46%)	488 (42%)	10,677 (48%)
Strong conflicts	1,870 (30%)	1,673 (34%)	392 (33%)	7,043 (32%)
Very strong conflicts	552 (8.8%)	454 (9.3%)	134 (11%)	2,006 (9.1%)
Young and old conflict				
There are no conflicts	1,547 (25%)	1,128 (23%)	292 (25%)	5,084 (23%)
Not very strong conflicts	3,106 (49%)	2,313 (47%)	532 (45%)	10,746 (49%)
Strong conflicts	1,224 (19%)	1,115 (23%)	277 (24%)	4,918 (22%)
Very strong conflicts	404 (6.4%)	348 (7.1%)	73 (6.2%)	1,395 (6.3%)
Migrant and non-migrant conflict				
There are no conflicts	866 (14%)	643 (13%)	184 (16%)	3,037 (14%)
Not very strong conflicts	2,572 (41%)	1,871 (38%)	416 (35%)	8,776 (40%)

Characteristic	**stable**, N = 6,281[1]	**climbers**, N = 4,904[1]	**fallers**, N = 1,174[1]	**other**, N = 22,143[1]
Strong conflicts	2,137 (34%)	1,756 (36%)	411 (35%)	7,814 (35%)
Very strong conflicts	706 (11%)	634 (13%)	163 (14%)	2,516 (11%)
ses.f				
low	2,195 (35%)	1,567 (32%)	491 (42%)	7,411 (33%)
middle	3,505 (56%)	2,828 (58%)	632 (54%)	12,606 (57%)
high	581 (9.3%)	509 (10%)	51 (4.3%)	2,126 (9.6%)
sex.f				
Male	2,967 (47%)	2,382 (49%)	510 (43%)	10,694 (48%)
Female	3,314 (53%)	2,522 (51%)	664 (57%)	11,449 (52%)
age	52 (39, 64)	41 (31, 52)	58 (45, 67)	49 (34, 62)

[1] Median (IQR); n (%)

Table 15 shows different values based on Subjective Social Class trajectory types. Most noteworthy differences is that social fillers are more likely to be lower and middle class. Also slightly higher conflict perceptions on all dimensions except middle and lower class.

C.2.4 Correlations

Due to the low correlations between the predictive variables and the dependents I have omitted correlation graphs as they would are not very informative. Due to both the large number of respondents and the low amount of answer possibilities on most items. For example, the conflict dimensions has four possible answers, and the largest amount of possible answers on one of the predictors is 10. This provides only 40 possible different answers, which is difficult to plot in a meaningful way. In figure 45 this is shown. Although the distributions are somewhat different between countries, it is hard to observe a pattern from this.



Figure 45: Correlation between migrant and non-migrant conflict perception and Self-Assed Social class by country. (n=34502

I found one other correlation noteworthy to report, which is the unchanged socio-economic status variable with 6 possible answer categories, compared to the 10-point self-assessed social class. Figure 46 shows this graph. Some people categorize themselves as lower class on the scale from 1 through 6, while putting themselves on the middle point of the 10 point self-assessed social class scale. This is particularly apparent in the Philippines and South Africa. Despite lower class membership, some people feel they are moderately successful on the social ladder.



Figure 46: Self-assessed social class by SES per country (n=34502)

C.3 Random effects

In this section graphs are presented for the random effects of the full models discussed in the main text.

c.3.1 Rich and poor conflict model random effects



Figure 47: Random effects with confidence intervals, dependent rich and poor conflict, countries sorted by random intercept (n=34502).

c.3.2 Middle and lower class conflict model random effects



Figure 48: Random effects with confidence intervals, dependent middle and lower class conflict, countries sorted by random intercept (n=34502).

c.3.3 Management and workers conflict model random effects



Figure 49: Random effects with confidence intervals, dependent management and worker conflict, countries sorted by random intercept (n=34502).

c.3.4 Young and old conflict model random effects



Figure 50: Random effects with confidence intervals, dependent young and old conflict, countries sorted by random intercept (n=34502).

c.3.5 Migrant and non-migrant conflict model random effects



Figure 51: Random effects with confidence intervals, dependent migrant and non-migrant conflict, countries sorted by random intercept (n=34502).

Appendix D Assumption check

Assumption checks for the five models. Investigating the residuals against the predictive variables showed no problematic distribution so these graphs were omitted.

D.1 Rich and poor conflict

Figures 52-56 show the main assumptions graphs for the rich and poor conflict model. The straight lines in figure 52 are to be expected due only four possible answers. The Q-Q plots in figure 53 and 54 show that especially around the edges the data the ends/edges did not fit normal data.



Figures 52-56: Fitted values vs residuals (top left), Q-Q plot for normality of level 1 residuals (top right), Q-Q plot for normality of level 2 residuals (bottom left), linearity of residuals (bottom left). Dependent rich and poor conflict (n=34502).

D.2 Middle and lower class conflict

Figure 56 through 59 show the assumptions for the middle and lower class conflict variables. Generally same story as for rich and poor conflict However, as seen in figure 57 the level 1 residuals are more problematic. Although combined with the other variables this is relatively decent.



Figures 56-59: Fitted values vs residuals (top left), Q-Q plot for normality of level 1 residuals (top right), Q-Q plot for normality of level 2 residuals (bottom left), linearity of residuals (bottom left). Dependent middle and lower class conflict (n=34502).

D.3 Management and worker conflict.

Figures 60 to 63 show the main assumptions graphs for management and worker conflict model. A similar story as discussed in in d.1



Figures 60-63: Fitted values vs residuals (top left), Q-Q plot for normality of level 1 residuals (top right), Q-Q plot for normality of level 2 residuals (bottom left), linearity of residuals (bottom left). Dependent management and worker conflict (n=34502).

D.4 Young and old conflict

Figures 64 to 67 show the main assumptions graphs for management and worker conflict model. A similar story as discussed in in d.1



Figures 64-67: Fitted values vs residuals (top left), Q-Q plot for normality of level 1 residuals (top right), Q-Q plot for normality of level 2 residuals (bottom left), linearity of residuals (bottom left). Dependent young and old conflict (n=34502).

D.5 Migrant and non-migrant conflict

Figures 68 to 71 show the main assumptions graphs for management and worker conflict model. Mostly a similar story as discussed before, although noteworthy here is figure 68 which shows the country residuals to follow a weird sort of line, suggesting perhaps a certain pattern that follows over each of the four possible answer points on the dependent.



Figures 68-71: Fitted values vs residuals (top left), Q-Q plot for normality of level 1 residuals (top right), Q-Q plot for normality of level 2 residuals (bottom left), linearity of residuals (bottom left). Dependent migrant and non-migrant conflict (n=34502).

Appendix E Robustness

Some additional analysis done as a robustness checks. As discussed in the main text, trying to fix model convergence with either ML or reduced parameterization did not succeed, those models did not shows anything noteworthy and were not reported here.

E.1 Model with conflict as scale

For the model with conflict as a scale, the same five steps were done as with the individual conflict dimension analyses. The only difference is that conflict was now calculated as a scale. This was simply done by calculating an average score for the five conflict dimensions.

Results can be seen in table 16. Cronbach's alpha of the conflict scale would have been 0.82, which can be considered a good score. (source?)

The ICC in model 1: 13.57%, similarly low to the separate dimensions. Directions of effects consistent with single dimensions. Random effects have a similar standard error as with the single models. Significant findings on IHDI and the interaction between IHDI and the social fallers and social climbers. Effect sizes smaller than in some of the individual dimensions. Also no "double-sided" significance which I think is important to assess the interaction.

Assumptions in figure 72-75 look quite acceptable. Level 2 residuals in figure 74 look relatively acceptable, level 1 residuals seem to get under and over-estimated for normality in figure 73 ever so slightly.

Table 16: Dependent: social conflict perceptions, mixed-effects multilevel linear model (n=34502)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3[a]		Model 4		Model 5	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
Fixed part										
Intercept	1.246***	0.05	1.442***	0.047	1.442***	0.048	2.062***	0.278	2.073***	0.286
Sex (0 = male, 1 = female)			0.076***	0.006	0.076***	0.006	0.075***	0.006	0.076***	0.006
Age*10			-0.032***	0.002	-0.033***	0.002	-0.032***	0.002	-0.032***	0.002
SES refer = lower										
SES Middle			-0.058***	0.008	-0.062***	0.007	-0.062***	0.007	-0.062***	0.007
SES high			-0.089***	0.013	-0.093***	0.013	-0.092***	0.013	-0.092***	0.013
SES-scale			-0.013***	0.002	-0.013	0.002	-0.013***	0.002	-0.013***	0.002
Types refer =stable										
Fallers			0.060***	0.019	0.102*	0.045	0.100*	0.045	-0.508'	0.273
Climbers			0.025*	0.011	0.032	0.023	0.032	0.023	-0.275'	0.136
Other			0.024**	0.008	0.032	0.022	0.031	0.021	-0.099	0.142
IHDI							-0.781*	0.346	-0.795*	0.357
IHDI*Fallers									0.766*	0.340
IHDI*Climbers									0.390*	0.169
IHDI* Other									-0.163	0.177
Random part										
Country variance	0.054	0.233	0.052	0.228	0.056	0.236	0.049	0.220	0.048	0.218
Individual variance	0.344	0.586	0.338	0.581	0.334	0.578	0.334	0.578	0.334	0.578
Fallers					0.042	0.205	0.042	0.205	0.034	0.186
Climbers					0.010	0.101	0.010	0.102	0.008	0.088
Other					0.010	0.101	0.010	0.101	0.010	0.099
Deviance[b]	61219		60678.5		60423.8		60421		60414.3	
-2 log like[c]	-30607		-30302***		-30176***		-30175'		-30169**	

***p < 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 'p<0.1

a = Model did not converge b=REML c = significance compared to previous model, with ML



Figures 72-75: Fitted values vs residuals (top left), Q-Q plot for normality of level 1 residuals (top right), Q-Q plot for normality of level 2 residuals (bottom left), linearity of residuals (bottom left). Dependent, perceived social conflict scale (n=34502).

E.2 Linear models for country.

To analyse the countries separately, linear regression was performed. Two models were estimated for each of the conflict dimensions. One with just the covariates, and one with Subjective Social Class Types added. The main assumptions of linearity, heteroscedasticity and the impact of outliers was also briefly looked at.

Table 17 contains the condensed results of these analyses. Some of the lower IHDI countries: South Africa, Suriname, Thailand and the Philippines negative and often significant coefficients for climbers and/or fallers. Very richest countries, e.g. Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, Finland, very little findings and even significant findings have a very small coefficient. In general interesting points, some countries display large difference in conflict perception on some of the dimensions between the fallers and climbers compared to the stable group.

Even for models with significant findings, the assumptions in general looked problematic. There were a large amount of outliers in all countries for all models, indicating that some of the individuals who I was interested in for the analysis might be difficult to plot with conventional statistical methods (perhaps related: being a social fallers is an outlier on itself). If I had seen these results before the regular model, I would not have had the expectation that much results were going to be found in a multilevel model.

Lack of results for some of the countries might be attributed to the very small size of either the social climbers, fallers or stable group in some of the countries, for this I refer back to appendix C.1.3.

Table 17: Simplified results from linear regressions. (n=668-3723). ΔR^2 , if model improvement. A = assumptions, good (+), mediocre (~) and bad (-)

		Rich and poor conflict				Middle and lower class conflict				Management and worker conflict				Old and young Conflict				Migrant and non-migrant conflict				
Country	IHDI	Fallers	Climb	ΔR^2	A	Fallers	Climb	ΔR^2	A	Fallers	Climb	ΔR^2	A	Fallers	Climb	ΔR^2	A	Fallers	Climb	ΔR^2	A	N
South Africa	.468	.02	-.13		~	.04	-.31**	+	~	-.03	.05	+	~	.11	-.44**	+	~	.08	.03		~	2345
Suriname	.535	-.60**	.25	+	-	-.57**	.19	+	-	-.60**	.27	+	-	-.41*	.25	+	~	-.55**	.12	+	~	668
Philippines	.587	-.10	0		-	-.09	-.08		-	-.19	-.06		-	-.05	-.16**	+	-	-.08	-.11*		-	3723
Venezuela	.588	.64**	.13	+	~	.24	0		-	.13	-.29	+	~	.48*	.11		~	.67**	.29	+	~	878
Thailand	.646	.65*	-.24*	+	~	.36	-.39**	+	~	.28	-.38**	+	~	.50*	-.13	+	-	0	-.13	+	~	1148
Chile	.709	.28	.18*		-	-.13	.02		-	.20	.20*		-	.05	.05		-	.43*	.38**	+	~	1217
Russia	.740	.30*	.10	+	~	.01	.17		-	.25*	.37**	+	+	.06	.15		-	.14	.13		~	1334
Italy	.783	-.14	-.14		-	-.29	-.11	+	~	-.11	-.02		-	-.02	.11		-	-.16	.23*	+	_	1021
United States	.808	.31**	.16*	+	-	.02	.01		_	.35**	.01	+	-	.13	.04		~	.20	.11		-	1426
Israel	.814	.25	-.06		-	-.05	-.10		-	-.33	-.18*		-	.11	-.05		-	.24	-.03		+	988
Bulgaria	.816	0.01	-.07		-	-.39**	.05	+	~	-.16	.08	+	-	-.08	-.01		-	.01	-.05		-	855
France	.820	.11	.05	+	~	.10	-.05		-	.35**	.03	+	~	.13	-.03		-	.26*	.14	+	~	1293
Croatia	.851	.10	.10		-	-.04	.01		-	.22	.28*	+	~	-.08	-.01		-	.02	.16		~	913
Great Britain	.856	.03	.12		~	.19*	.06		-	-.02	.08		-	.13	.13		-	.03	.19*		~	1307

* p <0.05 ** p<0.01

Table 17 (continued). ΔR^2 , if model improvement. A = assumptions, good (+), mediocre (~) and bad (-)

		Rich and poor conflict				Middle and lower class conflict				Management and worker conflict				Old and young conflict				Migrant and non-migrant conflict				
Country	IHDI	Fallers	Climb	ΔR^2	A	Fallers	Climb	ΔR^2	A	Fallers	Climb	ΔR^2	A	Fallers	Climb	ΔR^2	A	Fallers	Climb	ΔR^2	A	N
Austria	.857	.45*	-.03		-	.45*	.02	+	-	.67*	.03	+	-	.41	.05		-	.26	-.15		-	1115
Taiwan	.857	.34*	.13*		+	-.04	.10		+	.16	.19**	+	+	.03	-.05		+	-.02	.05		+	1669
New Zealand	.859	.04	.10		~	.12	.05		-	.26*	.16*	+	~	.43**	.19**	+	+	.10	.15*		~	1012
Czech Republic	.860,	.48**	.03	+	-	.31*	-.02	+	~	.67**	.20*	+	~	.52**	.21**	+	~	.44**	.14	+	~	1649
Australia	.867,	.01	-.05		-	.09	-.10		-	.20	-.02		-	.37**	.13	+	~	.31*	.16		+	826
Germany	.869,	.10	-.01		~	.04	.04		-	.11	.13		~	.23*	.17*	+	~	.37**	.10	+	-	973
Lithuania	.882,	.22	-.04		~	.12	-.11		-	.07	.01		-	-.03	-0.18		-	-.07	-.27*		-	741
Sweden	.882,	.25**	.15*	+	~	.11	.06		-	.09	.17**	+	-	.10	.16*	+	-	.19	.10		~	1265
Denmark	.883,	.33**	.01	+	-	.08	-.03		-	.20	.11	+	-	.21	.06		-	.29	.11		~	771
Finland	.888,	.29*	.16	+	~	.09	.03	+	-	.22	.07		~	0	.04		-	-.14	.12		~	764
Switzerland	.889,	.11	.03	+	-	.06	.02		-	0.15	.03	+	~	.09	.03		-	.14	-.01		~	2482
Iceland	.894,	.07	.02		-	.03	.08		-	0	.01		-	.18	-.08		~	.09	.17**	+	~	1053
Norway	.899,	-.05	-.02		-	-.06	0		-	.01	.03		-	.16	14*		-	.07	.12		-	1066

* p <0.05 ** p<0.01